Saint Louis University School of Law

Scholarship Commons
All Faculty Scholarship

2013

Participation as a Theory of Employment
Matthew T. Bodie
Saint Louis University School of Law

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.slu.edu/faculty
Part of the Business Organizations Law Commons, and the Labor and Employment Law
Commons
Recommended Citation
Bodie, Matthew T., Participation as a Theory of Employment (April 17, 2013). Notre Dame Law Review, Vol. 89, 2013.

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarship Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in All Faculty Scholarship by an
authorized administrator of Scholarship Commons. For more information, please contact erika.cohn@slu.edu, ingah.daviscrawford@slu.edu.

No. 2013-20

Participation as a Theory of Employment

Matthew T. Bodie

Notre Dame Law Review, Vol. 89, 2013

PARTICIPATION AS A THEORY OF EMPLOYMENT
Matthew T. Bodie*

89 NOTRE DAME L. REV. (forthcoming 2013)

ABSTRACT
The concept of employment is an important legal category, not
only for labor and employment law, but also for intellectual
property law, torts, criminal law, and tax. The right-to-control test
has dominated the debate over the definition of “employee” since
its origins in the master-servant doctrine. However, the test no
longer represents our modern notion of what it means to be an
employee. This change has played itself out in research on the
theory of the firm, which has shifted from a model of control to a
model of participation in a team production process. This Article
uses the theory of the firm literature to provide a new doctrinal
definition for “employee” based on the concept of participation
rather than control. The participation test better delineates the
boundaries of employment and provides a framework for
addressing the stresses on firms and workers that are rife within
the modern economy.
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INTRODUCTION
The concept of employment plays an important role in various areas of the
law. Most obviously, labor and employment law protections found in local, state,
and federal law are limited to those contracting parties that are defined as
employees.1 However, many other areas of law draw distinctions based on the
fact that the actor was an employee, or that the actions were taken within the
scope of employment. Legal doctrines in intellectual property,2 criminal law,3 tort
law,4 and tax5 use the concept of employment in assigning rights and liabilities.
In these situations, the law is not regulating the employment relationship directly,
but rather adapting certain rules and regulations based on that relationship.

1

See, e.g., Marc Linder, What Is an Employee? Why It Does, But Should Not Matter, 7 LAW &
INEQ. 155, 157-58 (1989) (“The variety of benefits and protections conditioned on the existence of
an employment relationship is impressive: unemployment compensation, workers compensation,
collective bargaining rights, minimum wages and maximum hours, social security, pensions,
occupational safety and health, and anti-discrimination protection.”).
2
The “work for hire” doctrine is the most prominent. See 17 U.S.C. § 201(b) (2006). For further
discussion, see Part I.D.
3
The doctrine of “enterprise liability” renders an organization liable for the crimes of its
employees. See infra Part I.C.
4
Employers have long been liable for the torts of their employees committed within the scope of
employment under the doctrine of respondeat superior. See infra Part I.B.
5
Employees are treated differently within tax for a variety of purposes, including withholding,
benefit plans, and social security payroll taxes. See infra Part I.E.
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Because the same concept of “employment” is used across legal contexts,
one’s intuition is that the concept would remain largely consistent. And this has
largely been true. The concept of control has served as the unifying idea behind
the use of “employee” and “employment in various contexts.6 The common law
“control test” comes out of the original conceptions of master and servant from
pre-industrial English law, and the Supreme Court has used this test to define the
term “employee” in a number of federal statutory contexts.7 However, the control
test is not the unanimous answer; in fact, it may be losing its firm grip on the
category. Courts have long used the “economic realities” test in interpreting the
Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA).8 In addition, the D.C. Circuit recently installed
an “entrepreneurial opportunities” test that has received support from the
Restatement of Employment Law. 9 Foreign jurisdictions have looked to the
concept of “economic dependence.”10 Other jurists and scholars have argued that
there should not be any one definition of employment, and that instead the term
should be adapted to fit the needs of the particular statutory, regulatory, or
common law regime.11

6

It should also be noted that the definition of “employment” is limited to those relationships that
courts have deemed to be “economic” or “market-oriented” in character. For example, prison
labor, work within families, and student labor has been determined not to count as employment
because it does not take place within the labor market. As Noah Zatz has pointed out,
“employment law systematically faces disputes over both how to draw a market/nonmarket
distinction and whether that distinction matters legally.” Noah D. Zatz, Working at the
Boundaries of the Markets: Prison Labor and the Economic Dimension of Employment
Relationships, 61 VAND. L. REV. 857, 862 (2008). This article addresses the issue of whether
work that is considered “economic” is conducted within or outside of an employment relationship.
7
See Clackamas Gastroenterology Associates, P.C. v. Wells, 538 U.S. 440 (2003) (interpreting
employee under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA)); Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v.
Darden, 503 U.S. 318, 326 (1992) (interpreting the definition of “employee” under ERISA);
Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730 (1989) (interpreting the scope of the
work-for-hire doctrine).
8
See, e.g., Sec’y of Labor v. Lauritzen, 835 F.2d 1529 (7th Cir. 1987) (interpreting 29 U.S.C. §
203(d), (e)(1), and (g) (2006)).
9
FedEx Home Delivery v. N.L.R.B., 563 F.3d 492, 497 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (arguing that the Board
and the circuit had “shifted the emphasis away from the unwieldy control inquiry in favor of a
more accurate proxy: whether the putative independent contractors have significant
entrepreneurial opportunity for gain or loss” (internal quotations omitted)); RESTATEMENT (THIRD)
OF EMPLOYMENT LAW
§ 1.01 (Tentative Draft No. 2 (revised), 2009), at:
http://www.ali.org/00021333/Employment%20Law%20TD%20No%202%20-%20Revised%20%20September%202009.pdf.
10
See Guy Davidov, Who is a Worker?, 34 INDUS. L.J. 57, 59-60 (2005) (discussing the use of the
concept of “dependence” in British law).
11
See, e.g., Sec’y of Labor v. Lauritzen, 835 F.2d 1529, 1543-45 (7th Cir. 1987) (Easterbrook, J.,
concurring) (suggesting that the economic realities test be exchanged for a test as to the statute’s
purpose); Lehigh Valley Coal Co. v. Yensavage, 218 F. 547, 552-53 (2d Cir. 1914) (“It is true that
the statute uses the word ‘employed,‘ but it must be understood with reference to the purpose of
the act, and where all the conditions of the relation require protection, protection ought to be
given.”); Richard R. Carlson, Why the Law Still Can’t Tell an Employee When It Sees One and
How it Ought to Stop Trying, 22 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 295, 356 (2001) (arguing that the
concept of employment should be disregarded and other proxies for coverage should take its
place).
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This Article argues that there is a consistent meaning to the idea of
employment, but it comes not from employees but rather from the firm that
employs them. Ever since Ronald Coase’s The Nature of the Firm,12 economists
and legal scholars have puzzled over why the law created firms that stand outside
the market. The purpose of firms, Coase famously answered, is to avoid
transaction costs by allowing the parties to organize in a hierarchical manner
without the need for prices or specific contracts.13 As Coase put it: “If a workman
moves from department Y to department X, he does not go because of a change in
relative prices, but because he was ordered to do so.”14 Less well known is that
Coase then looked to the legal definition of employee to determine whether his
transaction-costs theory was supported in practice.15 He found that it was. Since
the “control” test was based on the employer’s ability to require its employees to
take specific actions, he concluded, “[w]e thus see that it is the fact of direction
which is the essence of the legal concept of ‘employer and employee,’ just as it
was in the economic concept which was developed above.”16
Coase’s approach to the theory of the firm was only the beginning. In
fact, Armen Alchian and Harold Demsetz famously rejected Coase’s workman
example.17 Scholars have continued to place importance on the role of employees
within the firm in defining what a firm is and why it has independent existence.
This rich literature, however, has been largely ignored when it comes to defining
the concept of employment. 18 This article seeks to correct that failing. The
theory of the firm contains a critical insight: the idea of employment is based not
on our notions of employees, but rather on our notions of employers. There can

12

4 ECONOMICA 386 (1937).
Id. at 386-87.
14
Id. at 387.
15
“We can best approach the question of what constitutes a firm in practice by considering the
legal relationship normally called that of ‘master and servant’ or ‘employer and employee.’” Id. at
403.
16
Id. at 404.
17
Armen A. Alchian & Harold Demsetz, Production, Information Costs, and Economic
Organization, 62 AM. ECON. REV. 777, 777 (1972) (“Telling an employee to type this letter rather
than to file that document is like my telling a grocer to sell me this brand of tuna rather than that
brand of bread. I have no contract to continue to purchase from the grocer and neither the
employer nor the employee is bound by any contractual obligations to continue the relationship.”).
18
A notable exception is Guy Davidov, who has discussed the concept of joint production and
incomplete contracts in developing a theory of employment. Guy Davidov, The Three Axes of
Employment Relationships: A Characterization of Workers in Need of Protection, 52 U. TORONTO
L.J. 357, 377-87 & nn.79, 101-117 (2002). Tim Glynn has discussed how Coase’s work on the
firm explains the shift to smaller firms and enterprise disaggregation. Glynn argued that the rise in
transaction costs from legal regulations such as labor and employment laws led many employers
to outsource the employment relationship onto fly-by-night subcontractors, who often dissolve or
disappear when faced with litigation. Timothy P. Glynn, Taking the Employer Out of Employment
Law? Accountability for Wage and Hour Violations in an Age of Enterprise Disaggregation, 15
EMP. RIGHTS AND EMP. POL’Y J. 201, 206-15 (2011). Scott Masten examined the definition of
employment in assessing the legal significance of the firm in practice. See Scott E. Masten,, A
Legal Basis for the Firm, in THE NATURE OF THE FIRM: ORIGINS, EVOLUTION, AND DEVELOPMENT
196 (Oliver E. Williamson & Sidney G. Winter eds., 1993). I endeavor to do the converse:
examine the theory of the firm literature in assessing the definition of employment.
13
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be no employee without an employer.19 And the converse is also true – there is
no employer without employees. The theory of the firm literature demonstrates
that the employer is a firm, and that the concept of employment is critical in
determining what the firm is and why it continues to exist.
Close examination of the boundaries between employee and independent
contractor may appear at first to be a tedious and inconsequential exercise. But its
theoretical and practical implications are massive. The popularity of the
employment relationship has seen significant erosion, as more companies seek to
outsource their chain of production and more workers enjoy only temporary
employment.20 At the same time, nationwide firms are placing greater importance
on their economic brands, and employees are critical representatives of their
companies when it comes to the value and influence of the brand.21 We grow
closer to a potential “death of employment”22 at the same time that multinational
corporations have more economic power than ever. These pressures ask us to
consider what, if anything, about the concept of “employment” is worth saving,
and if so, how best to save it. We need to identify our theory of employment law
in order to justify our understanding of it and the purpose of the category in the
first place.
Using the theory of the firm literature, the Article argues that the proper
definition of employee is not the control test, the economic realities test, or the
entrepreneurial opportunities test. Instead, it argues that the concept of
employment is generally used to differentiate between members and nonmembers
of an economic firm. In other words, employees are participants in a common
economic enterprise organized into a business entity. This definition provides the
best rationale for the use of the “employee” category in areas of law such as
intellectual property, tax, and torts. Moreover, the participation theory explains
while labor and employment law protections are based on employment: these
protections are designed to make the firm more responsible for its participants.
Because employees participate in the common economic enterprise as organized
into a firm, the firm in turn must take care of its employees within that common
enterprise.
The purpose of this article seeks to establish a new definition of
employment within the law based on participation, rather than control. Part I of
the Article discusses where (and why) the concepts of “employee” and
“employment” are used within the law. Part II sets out the various doctrinal
definitions of the terms “employee” and “scope of employment,” and also
examines the theories behind these definitions. Part III provides an overview the
theory of the firm literature and the role of employees within that literature. Part
19

In fact, the standard statutory definition of “employee” is the following exercise in passive
voice: “one who is employed by an employer.” See, e.g., 29 U.S.C. § 1002(6) (2006).
20
See, e.g., Peter Coy, Michelle Conlin & Moira Herbst , The Disposable Worker, BLOOMBERG
BUSINESSWEEK, Jan. 28, 2010, at 33 (discussing trends of temporary employment in the wake of
the financial crisis).
21
Marion Crain, Managing Identity: Buying Into the Brand at Work, 95 IOWA L. REV. 1179
(2010).
22
Alan Hyde, Employment Law After the Death of Employment, 1 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 99, 99
(1998).
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IV uses the theory of the firm to develop a new definition of employment within
the law based on participation. Finally, Part V briefly considers the future of the
concept of “employment” in the law.

I. THE CONCEPT OF EMPLOYMENT IN THE LAW
The terms “employee” and “employment” are used within the law for a
variety of purposes. This Part examines the role that the employment-related
categories serve in the various subject areas.
A. Labor and Employment Law
Lawmakers have used the concept of employment to create a set of rights
within the law that provide additional protections to those considered employees.
The statutes that comprise federal labor and employment law all have provisions
that are limited to those who serve as employees. Thus, critical protections
against race, sex, age, and disability discrimination,23 below-minimum wages,24
dangerous working conditions, 25 retirement funding requirements, 26 and threats
against collective activity 27 are limited to employees. State employment
provisions such as workers compensation and unemployment compensation are
also limited to employees. These statutory schemes are designed to provide
protections to employees as employees and not to any other groups, even if such
other groups might benefit from the scheme.
Along with using employment to define vicarious liability (discussed
below in Part B), the common law also has certain doctrines that are limited to
employment. The tort of wrongful discharge, for example, provides rights to an

23

See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2006) (“It shall be an unlawful employment action for an employer
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any
individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment,
because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin, or (2) to limit, segregate,
or classify his employees or applicants for employment in any way which would deprive or tend to
deprive any individual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an
employee, because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.”); 29 U.S.C. §
623 (2006) (providing similar protections against age discrimination within the employment
relationship); 42 U.S.C. § 12112 (2006) (providing similar protections against disability
discrimination).
24
See 29 U.S.C. §§ 206, 207 (2006) (providing minimum wage and overtime protections for
employees).
25
See 29 U.S.C. § 654(a) (2006) (requiring employers to “furnish to each of his employees
employment and a place of employment which are free from recognized hazards . . .”).
26
See, e.g., 29 U.S.C. § 1053 (2006) (providing for minimum vesting standards for employee
retirement accounts).
27
See 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1), (3) (2006) (“It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer (1) to
interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in section 157
of this title; . . . (3) by discrimination in regard to hire or tenure of employment or any term or
condition of employment to encourage or discourage membership in any labor organization . . .
.”).
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employee—not an independent contractor. 28 And employment at-will is a
common law doctrine that is arguably separate from the traditional set of rules for
contract interpretation.29 For these provisions to kick in, the individual must be
an employee. In addition, under agency law employees have a fiduciary duty of
loyalty to their employers.30 This duty generally requires the employee not to
compete directly with the employer while still an employee.31
B. Vicarious Liability in Tort
The concept of employment is used as the basic dividing line in the
doctrine of respondeat superior. An employer is liable for the acts of its
employee committed within the scope of employment, but it is generally not
liable for the acts of independent contractors that are working with it. 32
Respondeat superior has its roots in early master-servant doctrine, in which a
master was liable for harms caused by the actions of his servant.33 The doctrine
continues in the modern common law, with most courts using the term
“employee” in place of “servant.” Although many different justifications for the
doctrine have been given, most center around the responsibility for or control of

28

For a discussion of the tort of wrongful discharge, see RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF EMPLOYMENT
LAW § 4.01 Reporters’ Notes to cmt. a (to be reclassified as § 5.01) (Tentative Draft 2, 2009)
(“The vast majority of jurisdictions recognize some form of the tort of employer discipline in
violation of public policy, usually in discharge cases.”), at:
http://www.ali.org/00021333/Employment%20Law%20TD%20No%202%20-%20Revised%20%20September%202009.pdf.
29
The employment at-will rule is a default provision in employment contracts that the relationship
can be terminated at any time by either party. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF EMPLOYMENT LAW
§ 2.01 (Tentative Draft No. 2, 2009). The at-will rule may even be considered a “sticky” default –
namely, a default rule that requires more explicit or onerous expressions of intent to overcome.
See Deborah A. DeMott, Investing in Work: Wilkes as an Employment Law Case, 33 W. NEW
ENG. L. REV. 497, 498 (2011) (arguing that employment at will may be a sticky default); David
Millon, Default Rules, Wealth Distribution, and Corporate Law Reform: Employment at Will
Versus Job Security, 146 U. PA. L. REV. 975, 1028-30 (1998) (arguing that the default rule should
be changed from at-will employment to a “just cause” regime because the just cause regime may
better represent an efficient outcome between the parties).
30
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 387 (1957); Terry A. O’Neill, Employees’ Duty of
Loyalty and the Corporate Constituency Debate, 25 CONN. L. REV. 681, 685 (1993) (“All
employees owe a fiduciary duty of loyalty to their employer—be the employer a sole proprietor, a
partnership, a close corporation, or a large, publicly traded corporation.”).
31
Id. at 695 (“Until his employment is terminated, . . . he may not engage in actual competition
against his employer.”). Enhanced remedies, including disgorgement of compensation paid during
the period of disloyalty, are available in some jurisdictions under the “faithless servant” doctrine.
See, e.g., Astra USA, Inc. v. Bildman, 914 N.E.2d 36 (Mass. 2009); Charles A. Sullivan,
Mastering the Faithless Servant?: Reconciling Employment Law, Contract Law, and Fiduciary
Duty, 2011 WISC. L. REV. 777, 779-80 (discussing the doctrine).
32
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 2.04 (2006) (“An employer is subject to liability for torts
committed by employees while acting within the scope of their employment.”); RESTATEMENT
SECOND OF TORTS § 409 (1965) (“Except as stated in §§ 410-429, the employer of an independent
contractor is not liable for physical harm caused to another by an act or omission of the contractor
or his servants.”).
33
WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 410 (1765).
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the employer over the employee.34 Because the tort was committed within the
scope of employment, the employing entity is also liable for the injury along with
the employee. Employers can also be liable for the torts of independent
contractors, but generally only under one of three conditions: (1) the employer is
negligent in selecting, instructing, or supervising the contractor; (2) the employer
has a non-delegable duty to the public as a whole or the particular plaintiff; or (3)
the work done by the contractor for the employer is specially or inherently
dangerous.35 Unites States common law used to follow the “fellow servant” rule,
in which the employer was absolved of liability to an employee for an injury
caused by a fellow employee.36 However, this rule has generally been abolished
and/or rendered obsolete by workers compensation statutes.37
C. Criminal Liability
As in tort law, business organizations may be held liable under criminal
law under the doctrine of respondeat superior.38 Corporations and other business
entities are guilty of crimes committed by their employees if such crimes were
committed in the scope of employment. In order to satisfy the mens rea
requirement, courts have additionally required that the employee have acted with
the intent to benefit the corporation.39 Although the doctrine has faced steady
criticism over the years, it has become “firmly entrenched as, more or less, the
across-the-board rule of enterprise liability for all manner of crimes.”40 However,
the de jure rule masks a more complex reality. Courts and prosecutors have in
practice adopted a narrower standard of liability when it comes to institutional
guilt. At the front end, a series of Department of Justice memos over the last
decade chronicled the attempts to demarcate when corporations should be charged
34

PAGE W. KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 69, at 499–501 (5th
ed. 1984) (emphasis added).
35
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 409 cmt.b (1965). These are the three primary
circumstances; the employer is also liable when it has performed a contract using independent
contractors when those services were accepted in the belief that they were to be performed by the
employer and its employees. Id. § 429.
36
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 474 (1957) (“A master is not liable to a servant or
subservant who, while acting within the scope of his employment or in connection therewith, is
injured solely by the negligence of a fellow servant in the performance of acts not involving a
violation of the master's non-delegable duties, unless the servant was coerced or deceived into
serving, was too young to appreciate the risks, or was employed in violation of statute.”).
37
KEETON ET AL., supra note PK1984, at 575-76; J.M. Balkin, Too Good to Be True: The Positive
Economic Theory of Law, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 1447, 1486-87 (1987) ("[T]he fellow servant rule is
like a mastodon preserved in a glacier—it was rendered obsolete by workers' compensation, and,
given the general trend of twentieth century tort law, there can be no question that if workers'
compensation were abolished today few courts would follow the fellow servant rule in industrial
accident cases.").
38
N.Y. Cent. & Hudson River R.R. v. United States, 212 U.S. 481, 495 (1909).
39
See, e.g., Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 307 F2d 120, 128 (5th Cir. 1962).
40
Samuel W. Buell, The Blaming Function of Entity Criminal Liability, 81 IND. L.J. 473, 475-76
(2006). See also Jennifer Arlen, The Potentially Perverse Effects of Corporate Criminal Liability,
23 J. LEGAL STUD. 833, 836 (1994) (stating that the existing legal regime closely approximates a
rule of “pure strict vicarious liability”).
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with crimes. 41 All of these guidelines required more than mere respondeat
superior liability.42 At the back end, the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines assessed
punishment for corporate guilt based on whether “an individual within high-level
personnel of the unit participated in, condoned, or was willfully ignorant of the
offense; or tolerance of the offense by substantial authority personnel was
pervasive throughout such [entity].”43 Commentators have noted a change from
vicarious liability to more of a negligence standard on the part of corporate
management in overseeing internal investigations. 44 This move has had both
supporters and critics.45 However, the overall liability rule itself remains based on
respondeat superior.

D. Intellectual Property
The term “intellectual property” refers to a wide range of information to
which specific legal rights have attached. In some cases, intellectual property is
41

See Memorandum from Deputy Attorney Gen. Larry Thompson to Heads of Dep't Components,
Principles of Fed. Prosecution of Bus. Org. (Jan. 20, 2003) [hereinafter Thompson Memorandum],
available at http://www.justice.gov/dag/cftf/corporate_guidelines.htm; Memorandum from Deputy
Attorney Gen. Paul J. McNulty to Heads of Dep't Components, Principles of Fed. Prosecution of
Bus.
Org.
4
(Dec.
12,
2006),
available
at
http://www.justice.gov/dag/speeches/2006/mcnulty_memo.pdf; Memorandum of Deputy Attorney
Gen. Mark R. Filip, Principles of Fed. Prosecution of Bus. Org. 4 (Aug. 28, 2008), available at
http:// www.justice.gov/opa/documents/corp-charging-guidelines.pdf.
42
The Thompson Memorandum listed the following factors in determining when to charge a
corporation: (1) the nature and seriousness of the offense; the pervasiveness of wrongdoing within
the corporation; (3) the corporation’s history of similar conduct; (4) the corporation’s cooperation
and willingness to waiver attorney-client privilege and work product protection; (5) the existence
of a compliance program; (6) the corporation’s remedial actions; (7) collateral consequences of a
charge, such as harm to shareholders, pension holders, and employees; (8) the adequacy of
prosecuting the individuals involved; and (9) the adequacy of civil or regulatory enforcement.
Thompson Memorandum, supra note TM2003. Factor 4 became quite controversial, as courts
became concerned that the federal government was pressuring corporate leaders into giving up
attorney-client protections for their employees in order to spare a corporate criminal charge. See,
e.g., Unites States v. Stein, 541 F.3d 130, 135 (2d Cir. 2008) (finding that “the government
deprived [employee] defendants of their right to counsel under the Sixth Amendment by causing
KPMG to impose conditions on the advancement of legal fees to defendants, to cap the fees, and
ultimately to end payment”).
43
U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 8c2.5g (2004).
44
See, e.g., Kimberly D. Krawiec, Organizational Misconduct: Beyond the Principal-Agent
Model, 32 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 571, 572 (2005) ("[A]t least since the adoption of the
Organizational Sentencing Guidelines (OSG) in 1991, the U.S. legal regime has been moving
away from a system of strict vicarious liability toward a system of duty-based organizational
liability.").
45
For support for a deterrence-based approach, see Vikramiditya S. Khanna, Should the Behavior
of Top Management Matter?, 91 GEO. L.J. 1215, 1224 (2003) ("Corporate liability improves
deterrence when agents are judgment-proof because it places corporate assets at risk and thereby
forces the corporation to internalize the social costs of wrongdoing."). For criticism of the
monitoring-based approach, see Krawiec, supra note KK1, at 614 (2005) ("I conclude that the
U.S. legal regime's move away from strict vicarious liability to internal compliance-based liability
is unjustified by either theory or empirical evidence.").
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generated by a single individual: an author writing alone in her home, or an
inventor toiling away in the garage. However, in many cases, intellectual
property is generated by specific individuals who are working within the context
of a larger firm. How the rights to that “property” are divvied up have significant
legal and economic ramifications, particularly for firms and individual
employees.46
Federal law establishes ownership rights for copyrighted works. The
“work-for-hire” doctrine was originally established in the 1909 Copyright Act, as
that act specified that the author of a copyrighted work “shall include an employer
in the case of works made for hire.”47 The Copyright Act of 1976 continued this
doctrine, specifying that the employer is considered the author of any work made
for hire unless expressly agreed otherwise.48 The 1976 Act defines “work made
for hire” as “a work prepared by an employee within the scope of his or her
employment.”49 The Act does not further define employee or employment.
The default rule for patent law is that the employee who invents the patent
is the author, not the employer.50 However, the employer is free to contract with
employees explicitly for the rights to all inventions created within the scope of
employment. Even without an explicit contract, courts have found something
akin to a work for hire doctrine when an employee is hired to work on a specific
invention or problem; courts are more likely to conclude that “the employee was
hired to invent and therefore the firm owned all patents” through contract.51 In
addition, under the shop-right doctrine, employers enjoy a non-exclusive right to
use the patent without having to compensate the employee. A shop right arises
when the employee has created the invention on the job using the employer’s
materials. 52 If the employee creates the invention at work while using the
employer’s tools, the employer has a right to use that invention without cost.
Trademark presents a special connection between the firm, its employees,
and intellectual property. Trademark protection is what enables a group of people
to join together and be recognized as a common enterprise without fearing that
their reputation will be poached by outsiders. Just as patent and copyright
46

See KATHERINE V.W. STONE, FROM WIDGETS TO DIGITS: EMPLOYMENT REGULATION FOR THE
CHANGING WORKPLACE 127-29 (2004) (discussing disputes over ownership of human capital).
47
Copyright Act of 1909, Pub. L. No. 60-349, §23, 35 Stat. 1075, 1080 (repealed 1976).
48
17 U.S.C. § 201(b) (2006) (“In the case of a work made for hire, the employer or other person
for whom the work was prepared is considered the author for purposes of this title, and, unless the
parties have expressly agreed otherwise in a written instrument signed by them, owns all of the
rights comprised in the copyright.”)
49
Id. § 101.
50
The patent must be registered by the individual inventor. See 35 U.S.C. § 111, 115 (2006)
(discussing oath taken as part of patent process that the registrant is the “original and first
inventor”).
51
CATHERINE L. FISK, WORKING KNOWLEDGE: EMPLOYEE INNOVATION AND THE RISE OF
CORPORATE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, 1800-1930 180 (2009). See also Dan L. Burk, Intellectual
Property and the Firm, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 3, 15 (2004) (“In the absence of explicit contractual
terms requiring an assignment, an implied duty to assign may be found. Courts have tended to
recognize such an implied duty to assign patent rights in situations where an employee hired to
solve a problem engages in research, and the invention relates to that effort.”).
52
FISK, supra note CF2009, at 118; Burk, supra note DB2004, at 16.
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protections concern the allocation of information rights between employee and
firm, trademark concerns the allocation of good will and reputational rights
between employee and firm.53 Trademarks enable firms to transfer reputational
assets over to the firm, and thus deprive individual employees of their ability to
hold up the firm over their own reputational assets.54
Finally, the prohibition against the disclosure of trade secrets is not limited
to employees. The Uniform Trade Secret Act defines misappropriation of a trade
secret as acquiring the trade secret either by improper means or “under
circumstances giving rise to a duty to maintain its secrecy or limit its use.”55 The
Act covers any “person,” defined as “a natural person, corporation, business trust,
estate, trust, partnership, association, joint venture, government, governmental
subdivision or agency, or any other legal or commercial entity.” 56 However,
employees are expected to keep confidential any of the employer’s trade secrets to
which they are exposed during the course of employment.57 Indeed, employees
are primary targets for the protections against trade secret misappropriation. A
study of trade secret litigation found that 85% of trade secret cases involved either
current or former employees or business partners. 58 Employees are generally
presumed to have an implied duty to keep any trade secrets to which they are
exposed confidential.59 Moreover, the doctrine of “inevitable disclosure of trade
secrets” has applied in some jurisdictions to employees who leave the company
but (according to the court) must inevitably use the trade secrets they have learned
at their old position.60

53

Dan L. Burk & Brett H. McDonnell, Trademarks and the Boundaries of the Firm, 51 WILLIAM
& MARY L. REV. 345, 363-64 (2009).
54
Id. at 376-79.
55
UNIFORM TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1(2) (amended 1985), 14 U.L.A. 529 (2005) [hereinafter
UTSA]. The Act is model civil legislation that has been adopted at least in part by forty-seven
jurisdictions. 14 U.L.A. 71-72 (Supp. 2011).
56
UTSA, supra note UTSA, § 1(3).
57
O’Neill, supra note TON1993, at 695 n.65 (“Courts have held that when an employer discloses
its trade secret to an employee during the course of employment, the employee is bound by his
fiduciary duty of loyalty not to use or reveal it for his own personal benefit.”).
58
David S. Almeling et al., A Statistical Analysis of Trade Secret Litigation in Federal Courts, 45
GONZ. L. REV. 291, 294 (2010). The study also found that trade secret owners were "twice as
likely to prevail on a motion for preliminary relief when they sued employees as when they sued
business partners." Id. However, owners were also "over 70% more likely to lose a motion to
dismiss when they sued employees than business partners." Id.
59
See Unistar Corporation v. Child, 415 So.2d 733, 734 (Fla. 3d Ct. App. 1982) (“The law will
import into every contract of employment a prohibition against the use of a trade secret by the
employee for his own benefit, to the detriment of his employer, if the secret was acquired by the
employee in the course of his employment.”); Derek P. Martin, Comment, An Employer’s Guide
to Protecting Trade Secrets from Employee Misappropriation, 1993 BYU L. REV. 949, 953 (“For
most employees the law presumes a confidential relationship between employer and employee for
the purposes of protecting trade secrets.”).
60
See, e.g., PepsiCo v. Redmond, 54 F.3d 1262 (7th Cir. 1995); Rebecca J. Berkun, The Dangers
of the Doctrine of Inevitable Disclosure in Pennsylvania, 6 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 157, 157
(2003) (“The doctrine of inevitable disclosure restricts an employee's future employment if that
employee will inevitably use a former employer's trade secrets in the course of the future
employment.”).
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E. Tax
Firms are expected to differentiate between employees and independent
contractors over a host of provisions, including whether taxes need to be
withheld,61 whether the firm must pay a share of Social Security and Medicare
(FICA) 62 and unemployment (FUTA) taxes 63 for the worker, and whether the
workers count as employees for benefit plan purposes. 64 The IRS defines
employees based on the common law control test. 65 The consequences of a
misclassification can be extremely costly, as the business is then subject to the
mandatory back-tax formula. 66 In fact, Congress was moved to create a ‘safe
harbor’ for employers when it came to the employee-independent contractor
distinction. 67 The upshot of these requirements is to give the firm tax
responsibilities for its employees, while giving independent contractors tax
responsibilities for themselves. We thus see the differentiation between employee
and independent contractor: the firm is expected to manage and even pay some
taxes for its employees, while it must leave independent contractors to their own
devices.

II. THE DEFINITION OF EMPLOYMENT IN DOCTRINE AND THEORY
The categories of “employee” and “the scope of employment” define
certain contours within various areas of the law. For many statutory schemes, the
“employee” category does all of the work; once the identity of the person as an
employee has been established, that person has the rights conveyed upon
employees and can bring claims for violations of those rights. In other areas of
the law, however, the person and the context are relevant to establishing the legal
category; therefore, both “employee” and “scope of employment” are necessary to
establish. Both categories are considered below.
A. Defining“Employee”

61

26 U.S.C. § 3402 (2006).
26 U.S.C. § 3101 et seq. (2006).
63
26 U.S.C. § 3301 et seq. (2006).
64
26 U.S.C. § 410 (2006).
65
See 26 U.S.C. § 3121(d)(2) (2006) (defining an employee as, among other definitions, “any
individual who, under the usual common law rules applicable in determining the employeremployee relationship, has the status of an employee”); TREAS. REGS. § 31.3121(d)-1(c) (2012)
(finding an employment relationship “when the person for whom services are performed has the
right to control and direct the individual who performs the services, not only as to the result to be
accomplished by the work but also as to the details and means by which that result is
accomplished”). See also 26 U.S.C. § 3306(i) (2006) (stating that “the term ‘employee’ has the
meaning assigned to such term by section 3121(d)”); REV. RUL. 87-41, 1987-1 C.B. 296.
66
26 U.S.C. § 3509 (2006).
67
REVENUE ACT OF 1978, § 530.
62
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1.
The Common Law “Control” Test. — The “control” test is the
dominant standard for employment, both nationally and internationally.68 The test
finds its historical roots in the definition of “servant” in English common law.
William Blackstone describes the relationship between master and servant as one
of the three “great relations in private life,” along with husband and wife and
parent and child. 69 The relationship was used primarily not for contractual
purposes, but rather to establish the duties each owed to the other, and to establish
when a master was liable for the actions of the servant. The master was certainly
liable if the servant committed the act “by the command or encouragement of the
master,” but liability extended beyond such direct orders. Blackstone offered the
following example, and justification: “If an innkeeper’s servants rob his guests,
the master is bound to restitution; for as there is a confidence reposed in him, that
he will take care to provide honest servants, his negligence is a kind of implied
consent to the robbery.”70
Under what circumstances would one who contracts for labor be liable for
the acts of the laborer? The law does not render principals liable for the acts of
their agents taken outside of the agent’s authority.71 Such vicarious liability is
reserved for the master-servant relationship. English courts based the definition
of this relationship on the notion of control. The basics of the control test are
straightforward. A servant is one who is “under the duty of rendering personal
services to the master or to others on behalf of the master.”72 In addition, the
master must have the “right to control the servant’s work,” which means “being
entitled to tell the servant when to work (within the hours of service) and when
not to work, and what work to do and how to do it.”73 This right of control is
what separates master-servant from the principal-agent.
The Restatement Second of Agency is perhaps the most widelyrecognized source in American law for the principal-agent and master-servant
68

Davidov, supra note GD2002, at 367 (“Control/subordination is still the leading (and sometimes
the single) characteristic of employment relationships in many countries.”).
69
BLACKSTONE, supra note WB1765, at 410.
70
Id. See also WILLIAM PALEY, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF PRINCIPAL AND AGENT, CHIEFLY
WITH REFERENCE TO MERCANTILE TRANSACTIONS 126 (3d ed. 1840) (“A master is responsible for
the negligence or unskillfulness of a servant acting in the prosecution of his service, though not
under his immediate direction.”). But cf. Harold J. Laski, The Basis of Vicarious Liability, 26
YALE L.J. 105, 105-06 (1916) (describing the doctrine of respondeat superior liability for the
unauthorized actions of a servant as “novel” and concealing “a veritable hornets’ nest of stinging
difficulties”).
71
An agent can operate on behalf of the principal and can bind the principal by his or her actions.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 2.01 (2006). An agent can act for the principal even when
authority has not been expressly granted, as long as a third party reasonably believes the agent has
the authority. Id. § 2.03. However, respondeat superior does not extend to principals’ liability for
the actions of agents. As the Restatement explains: “Agents who are retained as the need arises
and who are not otherwise employees of their principal normally operate their own business
enterprises and are not, except in limited respects, integrated into the principal's enterprise so that
a task may be completed or a specified objective accomplished. Therefore, respondeat superior
does not apply.” Id. § 2.04 cmt. b.
72
FRANCIS R. BATT, THE LAW OF MASTER AND SERVANT 6 (1929), quoted in Coase, supra note
RC1, at 403-04.
73
Id. at 404.
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doctrines.74 Section 220 provides the following definition: “A servant is a person
employed to perform services in the affairs of another and who with respect to the
physical conduct in the performance of the services is subject to the other's
control or right to control.”75 As the commentary acknowledges, however, this
relationship is “one not capable of exact definition.”76 The Restatement provides
a ten-factor test to further determine whether the potential employer is exercising
control:
(a) the extent of control which, by the agreement, the master may
exercise over the details of the work;
(b) whether or not the one employed is engaged in a distinct
occupation or business;
(c) the kind of occupation, with reference to whether, in the
locality, the work is usually done under the direction of the
employer or by a specialist without supervision;
(d) the skill required in the particular occupation;
(e) whether the employer or the workman supplies the
instrumentalities, tools, and the place of work for the person doing
the work;
(f) the length of time for which the person is employed;
(g) the method of payment, whether by the time or by the job;
(h) whether or not the work is a part of the regular business of the
employer;
(i) whether or not the parties believe they are creating the relation
of master and servant; and
(j) whether the principal is or is not in business.77
The Restatement Third of Agency has adapted the language of these doctrines by
changing “servant” to “employee,” 78 but the doctrines remain relatively the
same.79
Master-servant doctrine makes no exceptions or differentiations based on
the relative status of the “servant” vis-à-vis the master. It may seem that highranking employees would not meet the test, as their actions are not controlled in
74

STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, AGENCY, PARTNERSHIPS & LLCS 19 (2004) (“In general, the single
most influential source of legal rules in this area remains the American law Institute’s Restatement
of Agency.”).
75
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 220(1) (1957).
76
Id. § 220 cmt. c.
77
Id. § 220(2). These factors have significant overlap with the criteria to determine “conditions of
dependency or subordination” included in a set of International Labor Organization (ILO) draft
recommendations. See Davidov, supra GD2002, at 402.
78
See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY §7.07(3)(a) (2006) (“ . . .[A]n employee is an agent
whose principal controls or has the right to control the manner and means of the agent's
performance of work . . . .”).
79
The primary difference in language, beyond the change from servant to employee, is the
removal of “physical” as a modifier for control. Compare RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY §
220 (1957), with RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY §7.07(3)(a) (2006). The Restatement Third
also moves the ten-factor test into the comments section. Id. §7.07 cmt. f.
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the same way as rank-and-file workers. However, no such exception exists.
Instead, control “indicates the closeness of the relation between the one giving
and the one receiving the service rather than the nature of the service or the
importance of the one giving it. Thus, ship captains and managers of great
corporations are normally superior servants, differing only in the dignity and
importance of their positions from those working under them.” 80 The
Restatement Third uses the same example but frames the justification a bit
differently: “In some employment relationships, an employer's right of control
may be attenuated. For example, senior corporate officers, like captains of ships,
may exercise great discretion in operating the enterprises entrusted to them, just
as skilled professionals exercise discretion in performing their work. Nonetheless,
all employers retain a right of control, however infrequently exercised.”81 The
only differentiation is that an employer may be liable for punitive damages if the
agent was employed in a managerial capacity and was acting in the scope of
employment, or the principal or a managerial agent of the principal ratified or
approved the act.82
The Supreme Court has made the common-law “control” test into the
default test for “employee” whenever used without further explanation in a
federal statute. In Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid,83 for example,
the Court said that “[i]n the past, when Congress has used the term ‘employee’
without defining it, we have concluded that Congress intended to describe the
conventional master-servant relationship as understood by common-law agency
doctrine.”84 It further found it appropriate to rely on the general common-law of
agency, rather than the doctrine of any particular state, in order to create a
national, uniform law of copyright.85 It thus relied on the Restatement Second of
Agency in developing a multifactor test. However, the thirteen-factor test used in
CCNV to illustrate the common law test differs from the Restatement Second of
Agency’s ten-factor test in several ways.86 The Restatement test includes these
factors not included in the CCNV test:
(b) whether or not the one employed is engaged in a distinct
occupation or business;
(c) the kind of occupation, with reference to whether, in the
locality, the work is usually done under the direction of the
employer or by a specialist without supervision; . . . [and]

80

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 220 cmt. a (1957).
See also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY §7.07 cmt. f (2006) The Restatement then
provides the example of a CEO who has bad vision but still wants to drive; the board can compel
the CEO to use a driver when on company business, despite the CEO’s authority over the
company. Id. § 7.07 cmt. f ex. 15.
82
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 217C(c) & (d) (1957).
83
490 U.S. 730 (1989).
84
Id. at 739-740.
85
Id. at 740.
86
Id. at 751-52.
81
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(i) whether or not the parties believe they are creating the relation
of master and servant.87
The CCNV test in turn includes these six factors not included in the Restatement
test:
the location of the work; . . .
whether the hiring party has the right to assign additional projects
to the hired party;
the extent of the hired party's discretion over when and how long
to work; . . .
the hired party's role in hiring and paying assistants; . . . .
the provision of employee benefits; and
the tax treatment of the hired party.88
The Court examined these factors and found the sculpture at issue in the case was
made by an independent contractor, rather than an employee.89
ERISA's nominal definition of “employee” is “any individual employed
by an employer,” without any further direction.90 The Supreme Court has adopted
the common law test as the basis for the Act’s definition.91 The Court cited to the
definition of the common law test provided in CCNV v. Reid and quoted the

87

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 220(2) (1957).
CCNV, 490 U.S. at 751-52.
89
The Court concluded as follows:
88

Examining the circumstances of this case in light of these factors, we agree with
the Court of Appeals that Reid was not an employee of CCNV but an
independent contractor. True, CCNV members directed enough of Reid's work
to ensure that he produced a sculpture that met their specifications. But the
extent of control the hiring party exercises over the details of the product is not
dispositive. Indeed, all the other circumstances weigh heavily against finding an
employment relationship. Reid is a sculptor, a skilled occupation. Reid supplied
his own tools. He worked in his own studio in Baltimore, making daily
supervision of his activities from Washington practicably impossible. Reid was
retained for less than two months, a relatively*753 short period of time. During
and after this time, CCNV had no right to assign additional projects to Reid.
Apart from the deadline for completing the sculpture, Reid had absolute freedom
to decide when and how long to work. CCNV paid Reid $15,000, a sum
dependent on completion of a specific job, a method by which independent
contractors are often compensated. Reid had total discretion in hiring and paying
assistants. “Creating sculptures was hardly ‘regular business' for CCNV.”
Indeed, CCNV is not a business at all. Finally, CCNV did not pay payroll or
Social Security taxes, provide any employee benefits, or contribute to
unemployment insurance or workers' compensation funds.
Id. at 752-53 (citations and quotation marks omitted).
29 U.S.C. § 1002(6) (2006). See Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co. v. Darden, 503 U.S. 318,
323 (1992) (saying the definition is “completely circular and explains nothing”).
91
Id.
90
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thirteen-factor test used in that decision. 92 While acknowledging that “the
traditional agency law criteria offer no paradigm of determinacy,” the Court
argued that the common-law test “generally turns on factual variables within an
employer's knowledge” and comports “with our recent precedents and with the
common understanding, reflected in those precedents, of the difference between
an employee and an independent contractor.” 93 The Court rejected the lower
court’s definition, which was similar to the “economic realities” test, because it
found that ERISA’s statutory definition was not equally expansive, as it did not
include “suffer or permit to work.”94
The federal employment antidiscrimination statutes – Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), the
Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) – all share the same definition of
employee as ERISA: “an individual employed by an employer.”95 Up until the
Supreme Court’s decision in Darden, circuit courts had applied different tests to
determine employee status. Some applied the common law test, 96 some the
economic realities test, 97 and some a hybrid test looking at both control and
economic realities.98 After the Court’s holding in Darden that ERISA’s definition
should follow the common law test, circuit courts largely saw the writing on the
wall and applied the common-law test to antidiscrimination statutes.99 The Court
92

Darden, 503 U.S. at 323 (citing CCNV, 490 U.S. at 751-752). The relevant quotation provided:

In determining whether a hired party is an employee under the general common law of agency, we
consider the hiring party's right to control the manner and means by which the product is
accomplished. Among the other factors relevant to this inquiry are the skill required; the source of
the instrumentalities and tools; the location of the work; the duration of the relationship between
the parties; whether the hiring party has the right to assign additional projects to the hired party;
the extent of the hired party's discretion over when and how long to work; the method of payment;
the hired party's role in hiring and paying assistants; whether the work is part of the regular
business of the hiring party; whether the hiring party is in business; the provision of employee
benefits; and the tax treatment of the hired party.
Id.
93
Id. at 328.
94
Id. at 325-26.
95
See 42 U.S.C. § 2000-e(f) (2006) (Title VII); 29 U.S.C. § 630(f) (2006) (ADEA); 42 U.S.C. §
12111(4) (2006) (ADA).
96
See, e.g., Cobb v. Sun Papers, Inc., 673 F.2d 337, 339-41 (11th Cir. 1982).
97
See, e.g., Armbruster v. Quinn, 711 F.2d 1132, 1340 (6th Cir. 1983). See Patricia Davidson,
Comment, The Definition of “Employee” Under Title VII: Distinguishing Between Employees and
Independent Contractors, 53 U. CIN. L. REV. 203, 219-22 (1984) (discussing the Armbruster case
at length).
98
See, e.g., Mares v. Marsh, 777 F.2d 1066, 1067 (5th Cir. 1985). The hybrid test was arguably
“the favored standard for claims under both Title VII and the ADEA” prior to the Darden
decision. Lewis L. Maltby & David C. Yamada, Beyond “Economic Realities”: The Case for
Amending Federal Employment Discrimination Laws to Include Independent Contractors, 38 B.C.
L. REV. 239, 250 (1997).
99
Wilde v. County of Kandiyohi, 15 F.3d 103, 105-06 (8th Cir. 1994) ("Application of the
economic realities test results in Title VII coverage for some common-law independent contractors
because they are vulnerable to discrimination arising in the course of their work. Because the
economic realities test is based on the premise that the term should be construed in light of Title
VII's purpose and the construction is broader than at common law, Darden precludes the test's
application."); Maltby & Yamada, supra note MY1, at 253 (noting that “[t]he Darden decision has
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confirmed this approach in Clackamas Gastroenterology Associates, P.C. v.
Wells. 100 In Clackamas, the court cited to Darden and held that the same
common-law approach should apply to the federal antidiscrimination statues.101
Thus, the common-law test has now been ensconced.102 The Court specified that
“[w]e think that the common-law element of control is the principal guidepost that
should be followed in this case.”103
The Court has also used common-law agency principles in establishing
employer liability for acts of harassment by its employees. In the cases of
Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth 104 and Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 105
supervisors had subjected the plaintiffs to hostile work environments, and the
Court needed to determine whether the employer was vicariously liable for the
actions of its supervisors.106 After a detailed examination of agency law in both
cases, the Court unveiled the following standard:
An employer is subject to vicarious liability to a victimized
employee for an actionable hostile environment created by a
supervisor with immediate (or successively higher) authority over
significantly influenced judicial interpretations under Title VII and ADEA”). But see Frankel v.
Bally, Inc., 987 F.2d 86, 90 (2d Cir. 1993) (adhering to the hybrid test). The Frankel court found
“that in practice there is little discernible difference between the hybrid test (which pre-dates and
is not adopted in Darden) and the common law agency test.” Id. at 90.
100
538 U.S. 440 (2003).
101
Id. at 444-45, 447, 451.
102
The Clackamas decision was not an effort to distinguish employees from independent
contractors; rather, it addressed the question of whether a shareholder of a professional corporation
was an employee or instead an employer. And while the Court argued that “the common law’s
definition of the master-servant relationship does provide helpful guidance,” it tacitly
acknowledged that the usual factors to that test were inapplicable. Instead, it endorsed the
EEOC’s six-factor test, purportedly based on the common law agency test:
Whether the organization can hire or fire the individual or set the rules and regulations of the
individual's work;
Whether and, if so, to what extent the organization supervises the individual's work;
Whether the individual reports to someone higher in the organization;
Whether and, if so, to what extent the individual is able to influence the organization;
Whether the parties intended that the individual be an employee, as expressed in written
agreements or contracts; [and]
Whether the individual shares in the profits, losses, and liabilities of the organization.
Id. at 449-50 (citing EEOC, COMPLIANCE MANUAL § 605:0009 (2000)). This set of factors is not
exhaustive. Id. at 450 (“The answer to whether a shareholder-director is an employee or an
employer cannot be decided in every case by a shorthand formula or magic phrase.”). The
Clackamas decision has been criticized for creating a distinction between employees and highlevel employee-managers that need not and does not exist, at least in the common law of agency.
See Frank J. Menetrez, Employee Status and the Concept of Control in Federal Employment
Discrimination Law , 63 SMU L. REV. 137, 182-86 (2010).
103
Id. at 448.
104
524 U.S. 742 (1998).
105
524 U.S. 775 (1998).
106
Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 754.
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the employee. When no tangible employment action is taken, a
defending employer may raise an affirmative defense to liability or
damages, subject to proof by a preponderance of the evidence, see
Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 8(c). The defense comprises two necessary
elements: (a) that the employer exercised reasonable care to
prevent and correct promptly any sexually harassing behavior, and
(b) that the plaintiff employee unreasonably failed to take
advantage of any preventive or corrective opportunities provided
by the employer or to avoid harm otherwise.107
The standard provides a twist on respondeat superior liability, in that it makes the
corporation liable for actions such as sexual harassment that traditionally were not
held to be within the scope of employment.108 However, acknowledging that the
supervisor is aided in the agency relation through her or his power over the
employee, 109 the Court assigns liability to the business entity unless the entity
provided a reasonable method of correcting the problem and the employee
unreasonably failed to utilize it.110
OSHA offers its statutory protections to “employee[s] of an employer who
is employed in a business of his employer which affects commerce.”111 Given the
similarities between this definition and the definition used in ERISA and the
antidiscrimination statutes, it seems almost indisputable that the common-law
agency test would apply. This has been the administrative conclusion. 112
However, at least one court continued to apply the “economic realities” test postDarden, finding the analysis to be the same under both tests.113 Finally, courts
have often relied on the federal definition of “employee” for state statutes that
mirror and/or supplement federal employment protections.114
107

Id. at 765; Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807.
Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 757 (“The general rule is that sexual harassment by a supervisor is not
conduct within the scope of employment.”).
109
Id. at 760-65.
110
At least as to race and ethnicity discrimination, the dividing line between employees and
contractors is less important, as Title VII is backstopped by 42 U.S.C. § 1981. Section 1981
provides that “[a]ll persons . . . shall have the same right . . . to make and enforce contracts.” 42
U.S.C. § 1981 (2006). Thus, the dividing line between employees and nonemployees is not
relevant to the statutory protection. However, the statute has only been interpreted as prohibiting
racial or ethnic discrimination. See, e.g., Sherlock v. Montefiore Med. Ctr., 84 F.3d 522, 527 (2d
Cir. 1996); Maltby & Yamada, supra note MY1, at 257 (finding that “the scope of the statute . . .
prohibits discrimination only on the basis of race or ethnicity, thus excluding claims based upon
other grounds, most notably sex”).
111
29 U.S.C. § 652(6) (2006).
112
OSHA, Opinion Letter to San Luis Obispo Fire Association, April 2, 1996, at:
http://www.osha.gov/pls/oshaweb/owadisp.show_document?p_id=22132&p_table=INTERPRET
ATIONS (citing to Darden and the thirteen-point control test discussed therein).
113
Loomis Cabinet Co. v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm'n, 20 F.3d 938, 941 (9th
Cir. 1994) (“Here, the Commission used the economic realities test . . . , but determined that the
result would be the same under the Darden test. We agree.” (citations omitted)).
114
See, e.g., Strother v. Southern Cal. Permanente Med. Group, 79 F.3d 859, 866 (9th Cir. 1996)
(stating that “California courts have interpreted (the California Fair Housing and Employment
Act) in accordance with cases interpreting the (ADEA) and the Federal Civil Rights Act . . . (and
108
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The NLRA’s definition of “employee” does not itself provide a
definition of the term. Instead, the statute simply provides a laundry list of
exclusions. Excluded employees include: agricultural workers, domesticallyemployed healthcare or family care employees, public-sector employees,
railroad, airline, and other transportation workers covered by the Railway Labor
Act (RLA), independent contractors, and supervisors. 115 The Act did not
originally exclude independent contractors, and both the National Labor
Relations Board and the Supreme Court originally held that so-called
“newsboys” were statutory employees for purposes of the Act, even though they
were considered independent contractors.116 The Court explicitly rejected the
common law distinction between employees and independent contractors,
holding that the news vendors in question were “subject, as a matter of
economic fact, to the evils the statute was designed to eradicate.”117 However,
Congress rejected this interpretation of the Act and moved in 1947 to add
independent contractors specifically to the list of excluded categories. The
Board then adopted the common-law right to control test in excluding
independent contractors. The Supreme Court sanctioned this test in NLRB v.
United Insurance Co.,118 making clear that the Board had a range of discretion
in implementing the test.
The Board has had occasion to rule on employee status in a variety of
contexts: newspaper carriers,119 nightclub performers,120 gas station operators,121
and novelty vendors. 122 Two recurring areas of difficulty have been delivery
truck drivers and taxicab operators. In both cases, the workers may own their
equipment, but they often operate within a system created and regulated by one
overall company. Thus the Board has found both ways on employee status
therefore) we look to federal cases in those areas that have addressed whatever an individual
labelled as a partner can be considered an employee for the purpose of employment discrimination
laws”) (citation omitted); Lilley v. BTM Corp. 958 F.2d 746, 750 n.2 (6th Cir. 1992) (stating that
“ADEA standards governing employment status also apply to Michigan's Elliot-Larsen Act, Mich.
Comp. Laws, S 37.2101 et seq”); Frishberg v. Esprit De Corp., Inc. 778 F. Supp. 793, 798
(S.D.N.Y. 1991) (stating that “(s)ince New York distinguishes between employees and
independent contractors in a sufficiently similar manner, the court will use the federal test for both
state and federal claims”) (footnote omitted).
115
29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (2006).
116
N.L.R.B. v. Hearst Publications, Inc., 322 U.S. 111 (1944).
117
Id. at 127.
118
390 U.S. 254 (1968). Noting that “[t]here are innumerable situations which arise in the
common law where it is difficult to say whether a particular individual is an employee or an
independent contractor," the Court required courts to uphold reasonable determinations “even
though a court would justifiably have made a different choice had the matter been before it de
novo.” Id. at 258, 260.
119
Compare Philadelphia Newspapers, 238 N.L.R.B. 835 (1978) (finding distributors to be
employees) with Glen Falls Newspapers, 303 N.L.R.B. 614 (1991) (finding distributors to be
independent contractors).
120
Harrah’s Club v. N.L.R.B., 446 F.32d 471(9th Cir. 1971) (finding such performers to be
independent contractors).
121
American Oil Co., 188 N.L.R.B. 438 (1971) (finding operators to be independent contractors).
122
ARA Leisure Servs. V. N.L.R.B., 782 F.2d 456 (4th Cir. 1986) (upholding the Board’s
conclusion that such workers were employees).
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depending on variations between the structures of the jobs. In Roadway
Package Systems, Inc.,123 the Board found delivery truck drivers working for a
nationwide package delivery company to be employees, based on their lack of
prior experience, their (de facto) exclusive arrangements with the company, and
the uniformity of their operating procedures. However, in a companion case,
the board found the drivers in Dial-A-Mattress Operating Corp. 124 to be
independent contractors.
The Dial-A-Mattress drivers had much more
flexibility in choosing and outfitting their trucks, and their trucks displayed the
names of the individual trucker’s company. The Board has used these two cases
as lodestars in more recent analyses.125
The Board has taken care to emphasize that the common-law agency test,
although often called the “control” test, has many factors in play beyond
control. Thus, while control may be important in determining employee status,
it is not the controlling factor. Instead, the variety of factors listed in
Restatement Second of Agency § 220 are to be considered.126 And although it is
not specifically part of the list of factors in § 220, the Board has used the
presence of entrepreneurial opportunities as another factor in evaluating the
independence of the workers. 127 The Board has rejected the addition of the
FLSA’s “economic dependence” or “economic realities” test, 128 however,
despite a recent dissent.129
Despite the doctrinal popularity of the “control” test, it remains something
of an enigma. Courts and commentators continue to bemoan its inability to
deliver clear answers.130 In its initial rejection of the control test in the context of
the NLRA, the Supreme Court said that “the assumed simplicity and uniformity,
resulting from application of ‘common-law standards,’ does not exist.” 131
123

326 N.L.R.B. 842 (1998).
326 N.L.R.B. 884 (1998).
125
See St. Joseph New-Press, 345 N.L.R.B. 474 (2005).
126
The Roadway Express Board stated:
While we recognize that the common-law agency test described by the Restatement ultimately
assesses the amount or degree of control exercised by an employing entity over an individual, we
find insufficient basis for the proposition that those factors which do not include the concept of
“control” are insignificant when compared to those that do. Section 220(2) of the Restatement
refers to 10 pertinent factors as “among others,” thereby specifically permitting the consideration
of other relevant factors as well, depending on the factual circumstances presented.… Thus, the
common-law agency test encompasses a careful examination of all factors and not just those that
involve a right of control.… To summarize, in determining the distinction between an employee
and an independent contractor under Section 2(3) of the Act, we shall apply the common-law
agency test and consider all the incidents of the individual's relationship to the employing entity.
124

Roadway Express, 326 N.L.R.B. at 850.
See, e.g., St. Joseph New-Press, 345 N.L.R.B. at 480 (considering entrepreneurial opportunities
for newspaper deliverers).
128
Id. at 481-82.
129
Id. at 483-84 (Liebman, Mem., dissenting).
130
See, e.g., Carlson, supra note RC2001, at 299 (“After nearly two hundred years of evolution,
the multi-factored ‘common law’ test begs the question of employee status as much as answers
it.”).
131
N.L.R.B. v. Hearst Publications, Inc., 322 U.S. 111, 122 (1944). The Court also said: “Few
problems in the law have given greater variety of application and conflict in results than the cases
127
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Perhaps more fundamentally, there is a concern that the idea of control is not the
proper proxy for the concept of employment. For some, “control” is too
expansive a term, going beyond the root notion of supervision that represents the
employment relationship. 132 For others, control is no longer critical to
employment, but rather an expression from a bygone era. 133 Several other
alternatives have arisen from various areas of the law to try to take at least some
share of the control test’s domain.
2.
The “Economic Realities” Test. — The primary alternative to the
control test, particularly in the realm of employment law, is the “economic
realities” or “economic dependence” test. It is generally interpreted to provide a
more expansive definition to the term “employee,” one that covers more
vulnerable workers who may have some aspects of independence from control but
lack true economic independence. It has its roots in the interpretation of critical
Neal Deal statutes soon after their passage. While clearly rejecting the commonlaw control test, these cases did not craft a specific and readily cognizable
alternative. Instead, they looked to the purpose of the statutes and attempted to
glean an approach that harmonized with that purpose. Interpreting the NLRA, the
Court noted that it was “not necessary in this case to make a completely definitive
limitation around the term ‘employee.’”134 But the Court did distinguish between
the traditional common law definition and a broader perspective based on the ills
at which the statute was directed. In other words, the term “employee” was “to be
determined broadly, in doubtful situations, by underlying economic facts rather
than technically and exclusively by previously established legal
classifications.”135 That reference to “economic facts” became “economic reality”
in later cases defining the category of “employee” in the context of the Social
arising in the borderland between what is clearly an employer-employee relationship and what is
clearly one of independent entrepreneurial dealing.” Id. at 121.
132
The D.C. Circuit argued:
Although this “right-to-control” test requires an evaluation of all the
circumstances surrounding the relationship between the company and the
worker, the extent of the actual supervision exercised by a putative employer
over the means and manner of the workers' performance is the most important
element to be considered. It is important, however, to distinguish such company
supervision from company efforts merely to monitor, evaluate, and improve the
results or ends of the worker's performance. Supervision of the means and
manner of the worker's performance renders him an employee, while steps taken
to monitor, evaluate, and improve the results of his work, without supervision
over the means by and manner in which he does his work, indicates that the
worker is an independent contractor.
C.C. Eastern, Inc. v. N.L.R.B., 60 F.3d 855, 858 (D.C. Cir. 1995).
FedEx Home Delivery v. N.L.R.B., 563 F.3d 492, 497 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (“Gradually, however,
a verbal formulation emerged that sought to identify the essential quantum of independence that
separates a contractor from an employee, a process . . . where we used words like control but
struggled to articulate exactly what we meant by them. . . . In other words, ‘control’ was close to
what we were trying to capture, but it wasn't a perfect concurrence. It was as if the sheet music just
didn't quite match the tune.”).
134
N.L.R.B. v. Hearst Publications, Inc., 322 U.S. 111, 130 (1944).
135
Id. at 129.
133
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Security Act 136 and the Fair Labor Standards Act. 137 This test—lacking any
factors or even specific doctrinal definition—was something of a gestalt or
eyeball standard, designed to look at the overall economic relationship and
determine whether Congress intended such a relationship to come under the
purview of the particular statutory scheme.
Although the Court’s “economic reality” definition was overturned by
statutory amendments to both the NLRA138 and the Social Security Act,139 it has
remained in place with regard to the FLSA. That statute’s definition of employee
is the circular one found in many statutes: “the term ‘employee’ means any
individual employed by an employer.” 140 However, the Act also defines
“employ” to include “suffer or permit to work.”141 Because employ is defined
differently and more broadly, the Supreme Court has recognized that the FLSA
may extend to cover workers beyond the reach of the common law agency test.142
The definition of “employee” under the FMLA incorporates the standard from the
FLSA by reference,143 and thus courts have applied the same “economic realities”
test.144 Outside of these contexts, however, the Supreme Court has made it clear
that the “control” test is to apply as the default rule.
According to the “economic realities” test, “employees are those who as a
matter of economic reality are dependent upon the business to which they render
service.”145 Courts have generally looked to a number of factors in calculating
136

United States v. Silk, 331 U.S. 704, 713 (1947) (“We concluded that, since that end was the
elimination of labor disputes and industrial strife, ‘employees' included workers who were such as
a matter of economic reality.” (discussing N.L.R.B. v. Hearst Publications, Inc., 322 U.S. 111, 130
(1944)).
137
Goldberg v. Whitaker House Co-Op., Inc., 366 U.S. 28, 33 (1961) (holding that “the ‘economic
reality’ rather than ‘technical concepts' is to be the test of employment”).
138
LABOR-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS ACT, Pub.L. 80-101, 61 Stat. 136 (June 23, 1947), as
codified 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (2006).
139
SOCIAL SECURITY ACT OF 1948, ch. 468, § 2(a), 62 Stat. 438 (1948) (changing definition of
employee to exclude those who “under the usual common law rules applicable in determining the
employer-employee relationship, has the status of independent contractor”).
140
29 U.S.C. § 203(e)(1) (2006).
141
Id. § 203(g).
142
See Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Darden, 503 U.S. 318, 326 (1992) (noting that the FLSA
“stretches the meaning of ‘employee’ to cover some parties who might not qualify as such under a
strict application of traditional agency law principles”). See also Tony & Susan Alamo Found. v.
Sec’y of Labor, 471 U.S. 290, 302 (1985) (“The test of employment under the Act is one of
“economic reality . . . .” (citing Goldberg, 366 U.S. at 33)).
143
29 U.S.C. § 2611(3) (2006) (“ The terms “employ”, “employee”, and “State” have the same
meanings given such terms in subsections (c), (e), and (g) of section 203 of this title.”).
144
Nichols v. All Points Transp. Corp. of Mich., Inc. 364 F.Supp.2d 621, 630 (E.D. Mich. 2005)
(“ Because the statutory definition of FMLA, unlike the definition found in ERISA, incorporates
the FLSA's broader definition of ‘employee’ and ‘employ,’ the court will continue to apply the
‘economic realities’ test as described by the Sixth Circuit . . . .”). According to one survey,
however, courts have not applied a consistent test when it comes to individual liability under the
Act. See Sandra F. Sperino, Chaos Theory: The Unintended Consequences of Expanding
Individual Liability Under the Family and Medical Leave Act, 9 EMPLOYEE RTS. & EMP. POL'Y J.
175, 176 (2005) (finding that courts have utilized seven different tests in determining individual
liability for owners, executives, and supervisors).
145
Bartels v. Birmingham, 332 U.S. 126, 130 (1947) (interpreting tax provisions), quoted in
Mednick v. Albert Enterprises, Inc., 508 F.2d 297, 299 (5th Cir. 1975) (interpreting the FLSA).
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coverage under the “economic realities” test. One popular test, developed in
Bonette v. California Health and Welfare Agency,146 asks whether the employer:
(1) had the power to hire and fire the employee; (2) supervised and controlled
employee work schedules or conditions of employment; (3) determined the rate
and method of payment; and (4) maintained employment records. 147 Other
circuits have more closely mirrored the control test.148 But in recognition of the
FLSA’s broader coverage, courts have either implicitly or explicitly looked to the
“reality” of the workers’ dependence on the putative employer. 149 Such
dependence is often manifested through the economic weakness of the workers,
and the focus on economic reality is meant to cut through formalistic trappings to
get at the heart of the relationship.150 In Secretary of Labor v. Lauritzen,151 for
example, the court held that migrant workers on a pickle farm were employees
because they “depend on the [employer’s] land, crops, agricultural expertise,
equipment, and marketing skills.”152
The economic realities test remains the strongest contender in opposition
to the control test. Its concern with economic dependence provides more
protection to vulnerable workers.153 However, although foreign jurisdictions have
146

704 F.2d 1465 (9th Cir. 1983), overruled on other grounds, Garcia v. San Antonio
Metropolitan Transit Authority, 469 U.S. 528 (1985).
147
Bonnette, 704 F.2d at 1470. See also Benjamin F. Burry, Testing Economic Reality: FLSA and
Title VII Protection for Workfare Participants, 2009 U. CHI. LEGAL FORUM 561, 564 ("Bonnette
factors have been utilized by most federal circuits, including the Second Circuit.").
148
United States v. Lauritzen, 835 F.2d 1529, 1535 (7th Cir. 1987) (“Among the criteria courts
have considered are the following six: 1) the nature and degree of the alleged employer's control
as to the manner in which the work is to be performed; 2) the alleged employee's opportunity for
profit or loss depending upon his managerial skill; 3) the alleged employee's investment in
equipment or materials required for his task, or his employment of workers; 4) whether the service
rendered requires a special skill; 5) the degree of permanency and duration of the working
relationship; 6) the extent to which the service rendered is an integral part of the alleged
employer's business.”); Hopkins v. Cornerstone America, 545 F.3d 338, 343 (5th Cir. 2008) (“To
aid us in this inquiry, we consider five non-exhaustive factors: (1) the degree of control exercised
by the alleged employer; (2) the extent of the relative investments of the worker and the alleged
employer; (3) the degree to which the worker's opportunity for profit or loss is determined by the
alleged employer; (4) the skill and initiative required in performing the job; and (5) the
permanency of the relationship.”)
149
Lauritzen, 835 F.2d at 1538 (describing economic dependence as “the focus of all the other
considerations”); Hopkins, 545 F.3d at 346 (“As a matter of economic reality, the Sales Leaders
were dependent upon Cornerstone to such an extent that they could not plausibly be considered ‘in
business for [themselves].’”).
150
Mednick v. Albert Enterprises, Inc., 508 F.2d 297, 299-302 (5th Cir.1975) (characterizing the
ultimate inquiries as: “Is [the worker] the kind of person meant to be protected by the F.L.S.A.? Is
he dependent upon finding employment in the business of others . . ., (one of) those who
themselves are least able in good times to make provisions for their needs when old age and
unemployment may cut off their earnings?” (quotations omitted)).
151
835 F.2d 1529 (7th Cir. 1987).
152
Id. at 1538.
153
COMMISSION ON THE FUTURE OF LABOR-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS, REPORT AND
RECOMMENDATIONS
63
(1994),
at:
http://digitalcommons.ilr.cornell.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1004&context=key_workplace
(“The definition of employee in labor, employment, and tax law should be modernized, simplified,
and standardized. Instead of the control test borrowed from the old common law of master and
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adopted concepts such as “dependent contractors” and “employee-like” persons,
such workers have received only partial protections of the various employment
regimes. 154 An opposing strain of cases and commentators argues that those
workers who have their own entrepreneurial opportunities should not be
characterized as employees, regardless of notions of dependence.155 As a result,
some of the most vulnerable workers may not receive protection. Finally, some
have argued that the purpose of the statute should control, rather than notions of
employment. This approach has not taken hold in the law, and to some extent it
rejects the very idea of a common notion of employment.
3.
The “Entrepreneurial Opportunities” Test. — Despite the
Supreme Court’s explicit approval of the common-law agency test, the D.C.
Circuit appears to have adopted a new test based on the “entrepreneurial
opportunities” afforded to workers. The circuit first adopted this test in
Corporate Express Delivery Systems v. NLRB, 156 in which it held that the
determination of employee status should “focus not upon the employer's control
of the means and manner of the work but instead upon whether the putative
independent contractors have a significant entrepreneurial opportunity for gain or
loss.”157 The court justified the shift on the following grounds:
. . .[T]he latter factor better captures the distinction between an
employee and an independent contractor. For example, as the
Board points out, “the full-time cook is regarded as a servant
[rather than as an independent contractor] although it is understood
that the employer will exercise no control over the cooking.”
Restatement (Second) of Agency § 202(1) cmt. d (1957).
Similarly, a corporate executive is an employee despite enjoying
substantial control over the manner in which he does his job.
Conversely, a lawn-care provider who periodically services each of
several sites is an independent contractor regardless how closely
his clients supervise and control his work. The full-time cook and
the executive are employees and the lawn-care provider is an
independent contractor not because of the degree of supervision
under which each labors but because of the degree to which each
functions as an entrepreneur - that is, takes economic risk and has
the corresponding opportunity to profit from working smarter, not
just harder.158
In FedEx Home Delivery v. NLRB, 159 the circuit confirmed this new
“entrepreneurial opportunities” test as the proper standard for evaluating
servant, the definition should be based on the economic realities underlying the relationship
between the worker and the party benefiting from the worker’s services.”).
154
Davidov, supra note GD2005, at 61 (discussing Canada and Germany).
155
FedEx Home Delivery v. N.L.R.B., 563 F.3d 492, 497 (D.C. Cir. 2009).
156
292 F3d 777 (D.C. Cir. 2002).
157
Id. at 780.
158
Id.
159
563 F.3d 492 (D.C. Cir. 2009).
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employee status. The majority allowed that the common-law agency test
remained the proper standard, but argued that entrepreneurial opportunities was
“an important animating principle by which to evaluate [the common-law
agency] factors.”160 The court explicitly rejected control as the primary factor,
citing its indefiniteness as well as its failure to capture the essence of employee
status.161 The dissent found that the majority’s “entrepreneurial opportunities”
test failed to follow the Supreme-Court-approved common-law test, 162 a
contention supported by other commentators.163 However, the test has gained
the support of the Restatement Third of Employment Law, which defines
“employee” as one who works in the interests of the employer when “the
employer’s relationship with the individual effectively prevents the individual
from rendering the services as part of an independent business.” 164 The
Restatement defines this as follows: “An individual renders services as part of an
independent business when the individual in his or her interest exercises
entrepreneurial control over the manner and means by which the services are
performed.”165 The Restatement commentary agrees with the FedEx court that
the common-law right to control test “looks not only to the principal’s control of
the physical details of how the service provider performs the work but also to
other factors relevant to whether the service provider has entrepreneurial control
over the manner and means by which the services are performed.”166 Thus, the
essential question is: does the individual perform the work as part of the employer
as a firm or separately through a different and independent business entity?167
B. Defining “Scope of Employment”
Unlike the competing definitions for the term “employee,” the term “scope
of employment” has not been the subject of various theoretical approaches. The
term is not generally used in labor and employment statutes, as in most cases the
nature of the rights provided to employees guarantees that they concern activities

160

Id. at 497.
Id. (“It was as if the sheet music didn’t quite match the tune.”).
162
Id. at 510 (Garland, J., dissenting).
163
See, e.g., Jeffrey M. Hirsch, Employee or Entrepreneur?, 68 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 353, 357
(2011) (arguing that the D.C. Circuit’s new test “directly contradicts Supreme Court precedent”).
164
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF EMPLOYMENT LAW, § 1.01(1) (Tent. Draft, 2009). The full
definition is: “Unless otherwise provided by law or § 1.02 or § 1.03, an individual renders services
as an employee of an employer if: (1) the individual acts, at least in part, to serve the interests of
the employer, (2) the employer consents to receive the individual’s services, and (c) the
employer’s relationship with the individual effectively prevents the individual from rendering the
services as part of an independent business.”
165
Id. § 1.01(2). Entrepreneurial control is further defined as “control over important business
decisions, including whether to hire and where to assign assistants, whether to purchase and where
to deploy equipment, and whether and when to service other customers.” Id. § 1.01(3).
166
Id. § 1.01 cmt. a.
167
As the Restatement frames it: “Employees do not provide their services as an independent
business.” Id.; see also id. § 1.01 cmt. d (“The key question is whether a service provider
functions as an independent business while performing services on the principal’s behalf.”).
161
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within the scope of employment. 168 The one primary exception is workers’
compensation, which only provides protections against injuries incurred within
the scope of employment.169 Outside of labor and employment law, employers
are only liable for the torts and crimes of their employees in such actions are
taken within the scope of employment.170 And intellectual property protections
generally only apply to works made within the scope of employment.171
The general definition for scope of employment is that zone of employee
conduct in which the employee is performing her job duties.172 Efforts to define
employees’ duties as excluding all torts, statutory violations, or criminal activity
have generally been unavailing.173 Under the doctrine of respondeat superior, if
168

For example, the NLRA concerns the rights of employees to bargain with their employer; Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act specifically addresses discrimination in the context of employment;
ERISA involves pension and healthcare rights within the employment relationship; and FLSA
involves mandatory terms within the employment relationship. Once it is established that the
party is an employee and that the firm is the employer, there is no need to further establish that the
actions in question took place within the scope of employment—they do by the very nature of the
statutory protections.
169
See Note, Compensating Victims of Occupational Disease, 93 HARV. L. REV. 916, 918 (1980)
("To qualify for workers' compensation, the employee must suffer a personal injury 'by accident'
'arising out of and in the course of employment.'").
170
See supra Part I.B, C.
171
See supra Part I.D.
172
See, e.g., McGrail v. Dep't of Labor & Indus., 190 Wash. 272, 277, 67 P.2d 851 (1937) (“The
test for determining whether an employee is, at a given time, in the course of his employment, is
whether the employee was, at the time, engaged in the performance of the duties required of him
by his contract of employment or by the specific direction of his employer, or, as sometimes
stated, whether he was engaged at the time in the furtherance of the employer's interests.”).
The doctrinal definition for “scope of employment” can be quite detailed. For example,
Restatement Second of Agency has two provisions devoted to defining scope of employment, both
with lengthy lists of factors. See Restatement Second of Agency § 228(1) (defining conduct as
within the scope of employment "if, but only if: (a) it is of the kind he is employed to perform; (b)
it occurs substantially within the authorized time and space limits; (c) it is actuated, at least in part,
by a purpose to serve the master, and (d) if force is intentionally used by the servant against
another, the use of force is not unexpectable by the master”); id. § 229(2) (“In determining
whether or not the conduct, although not authorized, is nevertheless so similar to or incidental to
the conduct authorized as to be within the scope of employment, the following matters of fact are
to be considered: (a) whether or not the act is one commonly done by such servants; (b) the time,
place and purpose of the act; (c) the previous relations between the master and the servant; (d) the
extent to which the business of the master is apportioned between different servants; (e) whether
or not the act is outside the enterprise of the master or, if within the enterprise, has not been
entrusted to any servant; (f) whether or not the master has reason to expect that such an act will be
done; (g) the similarity in quality of the act done to the act authorized; (h) whether or not the
instrumentality by which the harm is done has been furnished by the master to the servant; (i) the
extent of departure from the normal method of accomplishing an authorized result; and (j) whether
or not the act is seriously criminal.”) Like the control test, however, these factors are in service to
an overriding principle: namely, whether the employee was acting as an employee or in her
personal capacity.
173
See, e.g., Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 800-803 (1998) (rejecting the notion
that supervisor sexual harassment takes place outside of the scope of employment because it is
against company policy or motivated by personal desires). But see Note, “Scope of Employment”
Redefined: Holding Employers Vicariously Liable for Sexual Assaults Committed by their
Employees, 76 MINN. L. REV. 1513, 1521-1522, and nn. 33, 34 (1992) (collecting non-Title VII
cases in which sexual assaults are determined to fall outside the scope of employment).
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the employee is on the job or within a zone of activity related to the employment
duties, the employer will generally be liable for the employee’s tort, regardless of
the employer’s efforts to define such conduct as outside of the employee’s duties
or authority. Instead, courts have adopted something along the lines of a
foreseeability test, in which the employer is liable if the employee’s actions are in
some way foreseeable. In two famous cases involving drunken sailors, both
Judge Hand and Judge Friendly found employers liable for acts of violence to
person and property taken by intoxicated employees.174 In both cases, however,
the courts found that the actions were taken within the sailors’ overall context of
employment and that therefore the employer was liable. Moreover, an employer
may be liable for employee actions taken outside of the scope of employment if
the master retains some level of responsibility (through intent, recklessness, or
nondelegable duty) or if the employee was aided in some way by apparent
authority or the agency relationship itself.175 Given “the proclivity of seamen to
find solace for solitude by copious resort to the bottle while ashore,” their acts of
violence—while regrettable and unauthorized—were sufficiently foreseeable to
be part of the costs of doing such business.176
Thus, the overriding notion for “scope of employment” categorization
questions has usually concerned not whether the particular employee is following
the script of her particular contractual relationship with the employer, but rather
whether the activity is part and parcel of the overall employment relationship.177
The employer is expected to absorb the costs of doing business as a firm, which
includes a certain level of employee activity that may not directly inure to the
employer’s benefit. As the Restatement Second of Agency put it, the “ultimate
question” in determining the scope of employment is “whether or not it is just that
the loss resulting from the servant's acts should be considered as one of the
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normal risks to be borne by the business in which the servant is employed.”178
Or, as then-Judge Cardozo put it, “The risks of injury incurred in the crowded
contacts of the factory through the acts of fellow workmen are not measured by
the tendency of such acts to serve the master's business. Many things that have no
such tendency are done by workmen every day. . . . The test of liability is the
relation of the service to the injury, of the employment to the risk.”179
C. Perspectives on the Theories of Employment
The existing common law doctrine defining “employee” has been routinely
criticized along two major axes. First, it is frequently accused of being a formless
multi-factor test that yields disparate results over time. 180 The proliferation of
multifactor tests, both from courts and from the Restatements, has shifted the
traditional test away from the notion of “control” to something closer to a
formless standard.181 As a result, the “control” test no longer really focuses solely
on control (if it ever really did, after Blackstone). Although courts often refer to
control as a “touchstone” or a “primary factor,” the other factors have come into
play as well. In fact, the same criticism can be leveled at the “economic realities”
test, which is often framed as a collection of factors with an overall “economic
gestalt” factor thrown in at the end.182 Even the “entrepreneurial opportunities”
test has been framed as a reconception of the common law test.183
Second, the common-law test is attacked for its general applicability.
Because the test serves as an across-the-board definition of “employee,” it is not
specifically tailored towards the purposes that particular legal regimes are
designed to address. As such, the very idea of employment has come under fire;
178

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 229 cmt. a (1957).
Leonbruno v. Champlain Silk Mills, 128 N.E. 711, 712 (N.Y. 1920).
180
See, e.g., N.L.R.B. v. United Ins. Co., of America, 390 U.S. 254, 258 (1968) (“There are
innumerable situations which arise in the common law where it is difficult to say whether a
particular individual is an employee or an independent contractor . . . ."); N.L.R.B. v. Hearst
Publications, Inc., 322 U.S. 111, 121 (1944) (“Few problems in the law have given greater variety
of application and conflict in results than the cases arising in the borderland between what is
clearly an employer-employee relationship and what is clearly one of independent entrepreneurial
dealing.”); FedEx Home Delivery v. N.L.R.B., 563 F.3d 492, 496 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (“While this
seems simple enough, the Restatement's non-exhaustive ten-factor test is not especially amenable
to any sort of bright-line rule, a long-recognized rub.”); Kisner v. Jackson, 159 Miss. 424, 427-28,
132 So. 90 (1931) (“There have been many attempts to define precisely what is meant by the term
‘independent contractor’; but the variations in the wording of these attempts have resulted only in
establishing the proposition that it is not possible within the limitations of language to lay down a
concise definition that will furnish any universal formula, covering all cases"); Carlson, supra note
RC2001, at 298-99 (arguing that the common-law doctrine “encourages ambiguity” and has
become “more complex” and “less predictable”).
181
See id. at 310 (discussing how courts had added most of these factors by the end of the
nineteenth century).
182
See, e.g., Sec’y of Labor v. Lauritzen, 835 F.2d 1529, 1535 (7th Cir. 1987) (discussing six
factors, in addition to economic dependence, that go into the “economic realities” test).
183
FedEx Home Delivery v. N.L.R.B., 563 F.3d 492, 497 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (“In other words,
‘control’ was close to what we were trying to capture, but it wasn't a perfect concurrence. It was as
if the sheet music just didn't quite match the tune.”).
179

PARTICIPATION AS THEORY OF EMPLOYMENT

30

as one commentator has asked, “why should employee status matter at all?”184
Instead of creating a category of “employee” that applies in a variety of different
situations, critics contend that courts, regulators, and legislators should focus
instead on the particular purpose of a particular legal regime and should tailor
coverage to meet that purpose. In discussing the statutory definition of employee
within the FLSA, Judge Easterbrook argued that the statutory purposes of that
statute were quite different from the common-law concerns at issue in the control
test.185 Instead of having a uniform definition across legal regimes, it would be
more appropriate, argued the judge, to develop definitions based on the functions
of the particular law.
Arguably, the Supreme Court began using the functional approach for the
New Deal statutes. Along with discussing the “economic reality” at hand, the
Court in NLRB v. Hearst Publications186 said that the definition of employee in
the NLRA “must be read in light of the mischief to be corrected and the end to be
attained.”187 However, Congress soon moved to amend both the NLRA and the
Social Security Act to reinstate the common-law control test. 188 The deeper
theoretical problem for the purpose test is its abandonment of any common notion
of employment. If certain regimes are based on the notion of “employee” to
determine the extent of coverage, then arguably the concept of employment is part
of the overall system of regulation. The purpose-oriented approach seeks to deny,
to a greater or lesser extent, the theoretical basis for this commonality. And yet
the concept of employment retains rhetorical and policy force. Indeed, even
proponents of the function or purpose test concede that Congress has continually
gone back to the “employee” category to shape the contours for various areas of
the law. 189 As such, the biggest problem for the purpose-oriented theory of
employment is that it has no theory of employment at all.
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Although we think of employees and employment as involving work or
labor, the legal definitions of those terms has much more to do with the
relationship between the individual worker and the person or entity for whom she
works. Employment is not simply labor; it is labor within a particular context.
And that context requires an employer. In the modern economy, employees
always work within the context of an economic firm. In fact, it is my contention
that it is the very existence of a firm that creates the employment relationship. In
this Part, I examine how the theory of the firm in economic and organizational
literature has focused on the employment relationship, and how being an
“employee” really means providing one’s labor within the context of a firm.
Employees have been central to our conception of the firm from the start.
In early neoclassical economics, the theory of firm was quite rudimentary; it
simply saw the firm as a black box which took in inputs and produced outputs.
No further dissection was undertaken. However, this theory did differentiate
between what was inside the firm and what was outside: employees and capital
assets were inside, while customers and suppliers were outside.190 Although this
conception of the firm was useful in early economic modeling and retains that
purpose even today, it was ripe for a reinvestigation that endeavored to give it
substance.
Ronald Coase started the exploration of the internal workings and purpose
of the firm in The Nature of the Firm.191 In an oft-quoted passage, Coase framed
the issue this way:
Outside the firm, price movements direct production, which is
coordinated through a series of exchange transactions on the
market. Within a firm these market transactions are eliminated,
and in place of the complicated market structure with exchange
transactions is substituted the entrepreneur-coordinator, who
directs production. It is clear that these are alternative methods of
coordinating production. Yet, having regard to the fact that, if
production is regulated by price movements, production could be
carried on without any organization at all, well we might ask, why
is there any organization?192
Coase’s answer was that the price mechanism can be costly. For certain
transactions, it is cheaper to simply direct the production to occur rather than
contracting separately for it. In order to avoid the transaction costs of contracting,
such transactions will occur within a firm rather than on an open market.193
Of course, the firm-based transactions described by Coase involve the
purchase of labor for a particular endeavor. In explaining these transactions,
Coase stated: “If a workman moves from department Y to department X, he does
190
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not go because of a change in relative prices, but because he was ordered to do
so.”194 The relationship between the entrepreneur-coordinator and the employee
is the primary distinction between the firm and the market. It is the reason for the
firm’s existence. Coase seemed to be arguing that firms would be unnecessary
but for the need to remove the employment relationship from the vagaries of
market transactions.
This conclusion is cemented when Coase considered “whether the concept
of a firm which has been developed fits in with that existing in the real world.”195
His answer? “We can best approach the question of what constitutes a firm in
practice by considering the legal relationship normally called that of ‘master and
servant’ or ‘employer and employee.’” 196 He then quoted at length from a
treatise concerning the common law “control” test, which provides that “[t]he
master must have the right to control the servant’s work, either personally or by
another servant or agent.”197 He concluded: “We thus see that it is the fact of
direction which is the essence of the legal concept of ‘employer and employee,’
just as it was in the economic concept which was developed above.” 198 For
Coase, the firm was defined by the employer-employee relationship.199
In an important response to Coase’s work, Armen Alchian and Harold
Demsetz also focused on the relationship of employees with other participants
within the structure of the firm.200 However, they argued that Coase’s focus on
control, authority, and direction was misleading. 201 Instead, they framed their
argument in these terms:
Telling an employee to type this letter rather than to file that
document is like my telling a grocer to sell me this brand of tuna
rather than that brand of bread. I have no contract to continue to
purchase from the grocer and neither the employer nor the
employee is bound by any contractual obligations to continue the
relationship.
Long-term contracts between employer and
employee are not the essence of the organization we call a firm.202
Alchian and Demsetz’s critique of Coase’s theory does not mean that employees
are no longer central to the idea of the firm. Instead, they argue that the
importance of the firm (as separate from the market) stems from the need to
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coordinate production in the midst of a variety of inputs. The need for a system
of team production is what separates firms from markets. Alchian and Demsetz
defined team production as “production in which 1) several types of resources are
used and 2) the product is not a sum of separable outputs of each cooperating
resource.” 203 As a result, team production is used when the team method
increases productivity, after factoring out the costs associated with monitoring
and disciplining the team.204
Alchian and Demsetz’s model seems even more focused on the role of the
employee within the firm than Coase’s model. The primary concern of team
production is making sure that the team members do not shirk their
responsibilities to the team. The inability to measure individual contributions to
productivity is what makes the firm an efficient alternative to markets, but it is
also the firm’s central governance problem. Alchian and Demsetz argued that a
specialized, independent monitor may be the best way of insuring that the team
members all contribute appropriately and are rewarded appropriately. 205 That
central monitor – the recipient of the residual profits – would be the firm.
Although Coase as well as Alchian and Demsetz personified this monitor in the
role of an entrepreneur-coordinator, such a collapse of powers into one human
being is only possible in the smallest of firms. In order to meet the criteria set
down by the model,206 the central component of team production is the firm itself:
a “person” who contracts for all other team inputs.
It could be argued that Alchian and Demsetz conceived of a firm detached
from employees, since the Alchian-Demsetz monitor must be outside the
production process while being able to negotiate with all team members for their
input and compensation. However, unless the “firm” is a sole proprietor, that
monitor is merely a mechanism for providing coordination of inputs. And
employees are the primary source of the inputs.207 Thus, the Alchian-Demsetz
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team production model does not exclude employees from the definition of the
firm. Although their model, with its focus on “inputs,” broadens the scope of the
firm to include investors as well as employees, the purpose of the AlchianDemsetz firm remains the management of employees through the coordination of
team production.
As theorists moved beyond these foundational works and into empirical
research, the identification of transaction costs, monitoring costs, and team
production have remained central concepts. Using the transaction-costs model,
Oliver Williamson and others have identified the types of contractual difficulties
which are likely to lead to firm governance, rather than market solutions.208 In
situations where contributions and compensation can be harder to define, the
parties will be left with incomplete contracts that require a governance structure to
prevent opportunism. This opportunism will be particularly problematic where
one or both of the parties must invest significant resources in assets specific to the
particular firm, project, or transaction. This asset specificity makes the parties
susceptible to hold-ups from their contractual partners in the absence of a system
of governance. Firms can be useful in providing the structures that deter
opportunism.209
The focus on assets has carried over into the “property rights” theory of
the firm. This theory, developed in a series of articles by Grossman, Hart, and
Moore, argues that firms are necessary as a repository of property rights for assets
used in joint production.210 By owning the property outright, the firm prevents
the problem of the commons (in which no one holds property rights over valuable
assets) as well as the problem of the anticommons (in which property rights are
divvied up amongst too many disparate actors). The Grossman-Hart-Moore
model dictates that the firm should be owned by those who contribute the most
valuable and most asset-specific property to the joint enterprise. They are not
only most necessary to the firm’s success; they are also the most vulnerable to
hold-up problems as the joint enterprise moves forward in time.
These theories have not focused on the role of the employee in the firm,
instead focusing on contracts and property rights. But the role of the employee in
these models still remains critical. Although the property rights discussed in the
model are generally nonhuman assets, the assets are “the glue that keeps the firm
together”211 and thus keep employees within the firm. Hart poses the following
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hypothetical: if firm 1 acquires firm 2, what is to stop workers at former firm 2
from quitting and forming a new entity?
For firm 1’s acquisition of firm 2 to make any economic sense,
there must be some source of firm 2 value over and above the
workers’ human capital, i.e. some ‘glue’ holding firm 2’s workers
in place. The source of value may consist of as little as a place to
meet; the firm’s name, reputation, or distribution network; the
firm’s files, containing important information about its operations
or its customers; or a contract that prohibits firm 2’s workers from
working for competitors or from taking existing clients with them
when they quit. . . . [W]ithout something holding the firm together,
the firm is just a phantom.212
Thus, the property-rights theory of the firm is designed in part to explain why the
firm’s employees remain with the firm.213
In the transaction costs model, employees’ contributions must be
recognized as assets of both the firm and the employee – often described as
“human capital.” Some types of human capital are transferable, such as education
or general skills, but other types are specific to the firm and generally worthless
outside it. To the extent an employee has invested in firm-specific skills, she is
subject to opportunistic behavior, since she has little leverage to get the full value
of those skills. In the transaction-cost model, employees may be precisely the
vulnerable yet valuable contributors to the joint enterprise who are most
vulnerable to opportunistic behavior.214
Along these lines, Rajan and Zingales have proposed an “access” model of
power within the firm. 215 The model defines a firm “both in terms of unique
assets (which may be physical or human) and in terms of the people who have
access to these assets.”216 Access to the unique assets is what defines the power
of the individuals within and without the firm. Rajan and Zingales define access
as “the ability to use, or work with, a critical resource.”217 Examples of critical
resources include machines, ideas, and people. As Rajan and Zingales make
clear, “[t]he agent who is given privileged access to the resource gets no new
residual rights of control. All she gets is the opportunity to specialize her human
212
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capital to the resource and make herself valuable.”218 Combined with her right to
leave the firm, access gives the employee the ability to “create a critical resource
that she controls: her specialized human capital.” Control over this critical
resource is a source of power. Rajan and Zingales argue that “[s]ince the amount
of surplus that she gets from this power is often more contingent on her making
the right specific investment than the surplus that comes from ownership, access
can be a better mechanism to provide incentives than ownership.”219 Given the
importance of access, the role of the firm is to allocate access efficiently amongst
the firm’s agents.220
Recent scholarship has taken the role of human capital even further. One
aspect of this capital—knowledge—has served as the basis for a new set of
approaches to the firm.221 Knowledge is defined as both explicit sets of formal
information as well as the ability to apply a wealth of unspecified information in
developing an answer or approach to a particular problem. 222 As one set of
knowledge-based theorists explains, “[t]he way the firm develops the knowledge
it will use in its production process and the extent that firm can bind this
knowledge to its structure will influence its organizational structure.”223 Rather
than emphasize the ownership of physical assets, which can be fungible and nonspecific, the knowledge-based theory focuses on the need to produce, distribute,
and ultimately retain valuable knowledge-based assets within the firm.224 Choices
between centralized and multi-divisional organizational structures,225 or between
covenants not to compete and employee stock options, 226 are based on the
management of knowledge within the firm. Along the same lines, a capabilitybased theory of the firm focuses on firm-specific knowledge and learning that can
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be translated into joint production. 227 This theory also emphasizes the role of
employees as holders of the firm’s capabilities.228
Knowledge-based theories of the firm serve as something of a bridge
between the economic, organizational, and sociological theories as to the nature
of the firm. 229 Management historians such as Alfred Chandler have long
considered the actual roles of employees within the firm to be the centerpiece of
firm dynamics.230 Organizational theory has built upon these insights and carried
them over to today’s firms, which generally offer flatter hierarchical structures
and more work in teams. In fact, one set of scholars examined the role of the firm
as a “collaborative community” in which employees work together toward
common goals. 231 Such a firm must have a shared ethos of contribution to a
collective purpose and the success of others;232 it must be structured so as to allow
for flexible organizational boundaries but highly specialized knowledge; 233 it
must base status on knowledge and expertise, rather than hierarchy;234 and it must
create an identity of independence and personal consistency. 235 Such
collaborative community firms are contrasted with the traditional hierarchical
firms, which manage employees with a traditional command-and-control
structure, 236 as well as market-based firms, which break down traditional firm
barriers through outsourcing and contingent workers. 237 This analysis to the
future of the firm seeks to develop the optimal approach to the relationship
between a firm and its employees. Indeed, the driving consideration seems to be
managing employees in a knowledge-based economy in the most efficient and
productive way possible.238
There are theories of the firm, such as the “nexus of contracts” approach,
that do not single out employees for special primacy of place.239 On the whole,
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however, approaches to the nature of the firm within a market economy have
focused in on the role of employees and employment within the firm, as opposed
to “independent” contracting parties outside of the firm. This insight has been
recognized from Coase up through the knowledge-based theories of the present.
As such, theories of the firm can serve as an intellectual foundation for the
concept of “employee” and “employment” within the law. The following Part is
an initial effort at building this foundation.
IV. EMPLOYMENT AS PARTICIPATION IN A FIRM
A. Participation as Theory
Coase recognized that in looking for the theory of the firm out in the real
world, one should look not at the law of entities, but rather the law of
employment. Although business organizations are the “firms” considered in
Coase’s musings, business organizations themselves did not represent the natural
boundaries of a firm for economics purposes. Rather, firms were represented by
the relationship between the legal entity and its employees. The relationship
between employer and employee was the “non-market” interaction that justified
the creation of the firm in the first place.
The weakness in Coase’s analysis, however, was his overemphasis on the
concept of “control” within the firm. Yes, an employee can be directed to work
on one task rather than another, and an employer can dictate the details of that
work in a very close manner. But the nature of the supervision need not be
significantly different than the close oversight a general contractor provides to a
subcontractor. Moreover, given that most employment contracts at at-will, both
the employer and the employee are free to walk away from the relationship at any
that the firm is merely a central hub for a series of contractual relationships. Michael C. Jensen &
William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership
Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305 (1976). Jensen and Meckling emphasize that the firm is a “legal
fiction;” it is “not an individual” and has no real independent existence. Id. Although Jensen and
Meckling’s model focuses on agency costs, it largely ignores employees as a whole. The agents in
question are the upper-level managers who are tasked to do the bidding of principals. Their theory
defines agency costs as the costs associated with monitoring by the principal, bonding
expenditures by the agent, and the residual loss. Id. at 308. The monitoring they describe does
look a lot like the “control” that Coase focused on as the key element in defining the firm.
However, Jensen and Meckling turn their attention to the relationship between shareholders
(principals) and management (agents), rather than the relationship of employees to the firm. Their
model seeks to describe the finance structure of the firm in conjunction with the management
structure of corporate governance. The nexus of contract theory is thus not really a theory of the
firm at all, but rather a theory of agency costs within a certain type of firm. See, e.g., Oliver Hart,
An Economist’s Perspective on the Theory of the Firm, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1757, 1759 (1989)
(“Principal-agent theory . . . fails to answer the vital questions of what defines a firm and where
the boundaries of its structure are located.”); Thomas F. McInerney, Implications of High
Performance Production and Work Practices for Theory of the Firm and Corporate Governance,
2004 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 135, 137–38 (“Scholars working in this paradigm do not offer theories
of the firm so much as theories of who controls the firm.”); Rock & Wachter, supra note RW2001,
at 1624 (“Jensen and Meckling, despite the title, did not really offer a full-fledged theory of the
firm. Rather, they offered a theory of agency costs within firms . . . .”).
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time. The potential long-term nature of an at-will employment relationship seems
even more fragile than a long-term indefinite contract between two corporations.
But Coase believed the employment relationship is outside the market, while the
long-term contract is not.
And so it is with the control test for employment. There are two primary
criticisms of the control test that mirror our concerns with Coase’s theory. First,
“control” seems to overstate the power exercised by the employer within the
relationship, at least with respect to supervision. An employee can be given a
relative degree of freedom on the job but still be considered an employee, while
an independent contractor can be given exacting specifications and still be outside
the firm. Even the Restatement Second of Agency recognizes that the degree of
actual supervisory control is a poor proxy for employment.240 Second, the issue
of “control” implies that those employees with more power within the
organization are less like other employees, as they are less controlled than they
are controlling. However, when it comes to traditional agency doctrine, the
power of the employee within the organization is irrelevant to their status as an
employee. As the Restatement confirms, “ship captains and managers of great
corporations are normally superior servants, differing only in the dignity and
importance of their positions from those working under them.”241
So if the concept of control is not the best proxy for the employment
relationship, what provides a better touchstone? We can look to the AlchianDemsetz critique of Coase for some answers. Alchian and Demsetz took on
Coase’s notion of control by arguing that employees received market direction
just as other economic participants did. Perhaps the direction was more oblique,
but it came nevertheless. Instead, Alchian and Demsetz argue that the critical
purpose behind the firm in the coordination of joint production. In their model,
team production is defined as “production in which 1) several types of resources
are used and 2) the product is not a sum of separable outputs of each cooperating
resource.”242 Firms are used when the team method increases productivity, after
factoring out the costs associated with monitoring and disciplining the team.243
The critical insight is that employment is defined not by control, but by
participation—participation in team production. It is not that employees are
controlled by the firm that makes them employees. It is rather that they are part
of a process of joint production, acting together within one unit. This unit—the
firm—has cast its lot together to engage in economic activity that would
otherwise be extremely difficult to tease out into separate contracts. Because
240

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 202(1) cmt. d (1957) (“[T]he full-time cook is regarded
as a servant [rather than as an independent contractor] although it is understood that the employer
will exercise no control over the cooking.”).
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Id. § 220 cmt. a. The Restatement Third of Agency seems to recognize this problem more
overtly: “In some employment relationships, an employer's right of control may be attenuated. For
example, senior corporate officers, like captains of ships, may exercise great discretion in
operating the enterprises entrusted to them, just as skilled professionals exercise discretion in
performing their work. Nonetheless, all employers retain a right of control, however infrequently
exercised.” RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY §7.07 cmt. f (2006).
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Id. at 780.
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these players are all working together, they are treated as a unit for certain
purposes.244 The firm is responsible for the actions of its members, and it has
responsibility to those members vis-à-vis the fruits of its production process.
This insight is borne out in subsequent theories of the firm. Both the
transaction costs model of the firm and the property rights model of the firm focus
on the assets of the firm, but these assets can include human capital.245 One of the
primary functions of the firm under these theories is to organize assets such that
employees continue to work at and invest their human capital in the firm. Thus,
the point is to manage employee participation, rather than employee control.
Similarly, the “power” model of the firm developed by Rajan and Zingales
revolves around the power of access to critical resources. Both the critical
resources and the access provided to them involve the participation of various
players within the process.246 Finally, knowledge-based theories of the firm look
to understand how firms manage the production and utilization of knowledge
within the firm.247 Such processes are best understood within the lens of joint
production and employee participation.
Thus, employment is not about the employer’s control over a particular
worker; control is not necessary or sufficient to the employment relationship.
Instead, what is needed is placement of the worker within the boundaries of the
firm. Such a worker is an employee; one who works outside those boundaries is
an independent contractor. Going forward, then, we should look to participation,
not control, for our touchstone in the legal doctrine of employment.
B. Participation as Doctrine
If the key to our understandings of employment is participation—
participation, that is, in an ongoing economic enterprise as organized into a
firm—then how do we operationalize this as legal doctrine? What would a
“participation” test look like? As it turns out, much of the doctrine has already
moved in the direction of participation; it just has not been recognized as such.
Although the notion of control has dominated the common-law test, most of the
factors in that test show the degree of participation in the enterprise. Look at these
other factors in the Restatement (Second) of Agency’s test:
(b) whether or not the one employed is engaged in a distinct
occupation or business;
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Guy Davidov has recognized that the concept of employee requires a governance structure
(such as a firm) outside of the market. He argues that structure is necessary as “a direct result of
two combined factors: first, our inclination to join forces and work together with others; and
second, the need to coordinate production to an extent that the market cannot satisfy.” Davidov,
supra note GD2002, at 377-78.
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See supra Part III.
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See Rajan & Zingales, supra note RZ1998, at 388.
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See, e.g., Gorga & Halberstam, supra note GH2007, at 1128 (“We show how the management
of knowledge resources required in mass production and high-tech firms differentially affects their
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(c) the kind of occupation, with reference to whether, in the
locality, the work is usually done under the direction of the
employer or by a specialist without supervision;
(d) the skill required in the particular occupation;
(e) whether the employer or the workman supplies the
instrumentalities, tools, and the place of work for the person doing
the work;
(f) the length of time for which the person is employed;
(g) the method of payment, whether by the time or by the job;
(h) whether or not the work is a part of the regular business of the
employer;
(i) whether or not the parties believe they are creating the relation
of master and servant; and
(j) whether the principal is or is not in business.248
These elements, particularly (b), (e), (f), (h), (i), and (j), indicate whether the
worker at issue is a participant in a continuing enterprise or instead an economic
actor that works outside of the firm. They are about firm boundaries. Employees
are those within the firm, while independent contractors are without.
Participation, not control, is the common theme.
The “participation” standard also synchronizes better with the modern
movement toward an “entrepreneurial opportunities” test for employee status.
The entrepreneurial-oriented test seeks to determine whether the employee is
located within the firm or outside of it. For example, the Restatement (Third) of
Employment Law describes employees as those who work in the interests of the
employer when “the employer’s relationship with the individual effectively
prevents the individual from rendering the services as part of an independent
Non-employees, on the other hand, exercise “entrepreneurial
business.” 249
control over the manner and means by which the services are performed.”250 This
test may at first seem related to the degree of control exercised by the employer
over the details of work, since it discusses control over the manner and means of
performance. However, the overall test seems designed to capture whether the
worker is engaged with the firm’s business or rather operating independently of
the firm. In other words, is the worker part of the firm or part of an independent
business? The D.C. Circuit’s description of its “entrepreneurial opportunities”
test is even more explicitly firm-oriented: it counsels that the determination of
employee status should “focus not upon the employer's control of the means and
manner of the work but instead upon whether the putative independent contractors
have a significant entrepreneurial opportunity for gain or loss.”251
248
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Participation within a firm should not be confused with formalistic
determinations such as whether the employee is on the payroll or is categorized as
an employee by the firm itself. These labels are obviously useful but do not tell
the whole story. After all, some firms will use disingenuous categories with the
purpose of avoiding the consequences of employment under the law.252 On the
other hand, a broad definition of participation will engulf a variety of nonemployees, including members of another firm that is engaging in a joint venture
or even a simple contractual relationship with the “employer” firm. For example,
a painting company with its own painter employees is arguably “participating” in
the economic enterprise of the firm that hires the company. A critical component
of the participation standard, however, is that an employee must be participating
in the ongoing economic enterprise as organized into a firm. A painter hired to
work at the firm through an independent company may be doing the same
painting as an employee hired by the firm itself. But the first painter is an
employee of the independent painting firm, while the second is part of the
ongoing enterprise of the firm itself. Factors in the common law test such as the
length of the engagement, the parties named to the contract, the method of
payment, and the parties’ beliefs about the relationship all point to the differences
between an employee and an independent contracting party, because they show
whether the employee is actually an ongoing participant in the enterprise.253 Of
course, line-drawing problems remain. In particular, workers who would
generally be seen as part of the employer’s regular business but have been
outsourced to a clearly separate firm would pose tough questions about the
meaning of “participation.” However, the participation standard would not
override existing boundaries to include workers who were clearly outside the
firm, even if the outsourcing were done for purposes of escaping legal
ramifications of employment.254
252

See Carlson, supra note RC2001, at 298 (“[T]he advantages (to employers) of employing
workers who are plausibly not employees motivate a good deal of arbitrary and questionable ‘nonemployee’ classification.”); Davidov, supra note GD2002, at 363 (“Deliberate misclassification is
becoming more and more common as a result of an increased emphasis on flexibility and the new
pressures of globalization.”).
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See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 220(2)(b), (f), (g), (i), (j) (1957).
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For an argument that an employer’s decision to shift work from employees to outside
independent contractors should in some cases constitute a violation of the underlying labor and
employment law regime, see Noah D. Zatz, Noah D. Zatz, Beyond Misclassification: Tackling the
Independent Contractor Problem Without Redefining Employment, 26 ABA J. LAB. & EMPL. L.
279, 289 (2011) (“If I am correct, then the right question to ask is not who is an employee, but
instead to what extent should firms be able to choose organizational structures that preclude
unionization by avoiding having employer-employee relationships at all.”). See also Davidov,
supra note GD2002, at 395-98 (discussing “dependent contractors” as a classification of workers
that are not employees but deserve some labor- and employment-type protections); Brian A.
Langille & Guy Davidov, Beyond Employees and Independent Contractors: A View from
Canada, 21 COMP. LABOR L. & POL’Y J. 7, 22-29 (1999) (discussing the category of dependent
contractors in Canadian law).
A participation theory of employment could be used to justify considering certain types
of labor relationships to be within the firm, even if such workers are employed by outside firms.
Such joint employer relationships could justify coverage as “employees,” even if the employees
were also in separate firms. Cf. Zatz, supra, at 286 (discussing the difficulty of categorizing joint-
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Looking at the areas of law in which employment plays a role, the concept
of “participation” arguably does a better job of defining employee status than does
control. The doctrine of respondeat superior dictates when a firm is liable for the
actions of one of its participants. If control were the touchstone, then liability
issues would focus on the extent to which the employees’ actions were controlled
by the firm in carrying out the tortious act. Instead, courts have generally
provided broad berth to employee actions in finding that they were taken within
the scope of employment. Firms are liable for the actions of their employees not
because the employees were being controlled, but because the employees were
part of a joint enterprise, and that enterprise should bear the costs created by its
participants. This justification matches up with the standard theoretical defenses
for respondeat superior, which justify the doctrine based on risk-allocative or
retributivist theories.255 As argued in the Prosser & Keeton treatise:
A multitude of very ingenious reasons have been offered for
the vicarious liability of a master: he has a more or less fictitious
“control” over the behavior of the servant; he has “set the whole
thing in motion,” and is therefore responsible for what has
happened; he has selected the servant and trusted him, and so
should suffer for his wrongs, rather than an innocent stranger who
has had no opportunity to protect himself; it is a great concession
that any man should be permitted to employ another at all, and
there should be a corresponding responsibility as the price to be
paid for it—or, more frankly and cynically, “In hard fact, the
reason for the employers' liability is the damages are taken from a
deep pocket.” None of these reasons is so self-sufficient as to carry
conviction, although they are all in accord with the general
common law notion that one who is in a position to exercise some
general control over the situation must exercise it or bear the loss .
...
What has emerged as the modern justification for vicarious
liability is a rule of policy, a deliberate allocation of a risk. The
losses caused by the torts of employees, which as a practical matter
are sure to occur in the conduct of the employer's enterprise, are
placed upon that enterprise itself, as a required cost of doing
business. They are placed upon the employer because, having
engaged in an enterprise, which will on the basis of all past
experience involve harm to others through the torts of employees,
and sought to profit by it, it is just that he, rather than the innocent
injured plaintiff, should bear them; and because he is better able to
absorb them, and to distribute them, through prices, rates or
employer structures in the FLSA context). However, such an approach would deserve a more
sustained and extensive treatment outside of the scope of this paper.
255
See, e.g., THOMAS BATY, VICARIOUS LIABILITY 100 (1918); RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC
ANALYSIS OF LAW 188 (7th ed. 2007).
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liability insurance, to the public, and so to shift them to society, to
the community at large.256
In other words, because the firm is the locus of joint production, and the employee
is engaged in that joint production, the firm should bear the risk.257 A similar
theory applies to criminal enterprise liability: the firm is blamed if one of its
participating employees engaged in the criminal activity within the scope of
employment and with the intent to benefit the firm. It does not matter whether the
employee was “controlled” by the firm in his or her criminal activity; it only
matters that the employee was participating in the work of the firm when
committing the crime.
The role of employment in intellectual property doctrine also accords
more closely to a participation theory than a control theory. Under the work-forhire doctrine, the employee marks the boundaries of the firm; works made by
employees within the scope of their employment are considered property of the
firm, while works made by independent contractors are not (by default). Under
the shop-right doctrine, employers enjoy a non-exclusive right to use a patent
created by an employee without having to compensate the employee. A shop
right arises when the employee has created the invention on the job using the
employer’s materials. 258 Once again, the firm provides the context: if the
employee creates the invention at work while using the employer’s tools, the
employer has a right to use that invention without cost. Because the employee
has been engaged in the process of joint production, under circumstances where it
may be difficult to separate out each individual contributor’s contributions, the
employee has (impliedly) agreed that their joint property belongs to the firm. It is
their participation within the firm—not their control by the firm—that justifies the
transfer of property rights from individual to group.
The participation approach matches up with other recent scholarship
considering IP rights from the perspective of the theory of the firm. 259 This
scholarship uses both the transaction-costs model and the property-rights model in
demonstrating the connections between intellectual property, employees, and the
firm. Using the transaction-costs model, Robert Merges points to the concern
about employee opportunism and holdups to explain why employers generally
256
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hold intellectual property rights over employee inventions. 260 Comparing a
system of registered patents to a system based solely on trade secret protection,
Paul Heald argues that patent law makes it easier to buy and sell the information
at issue. The patent buyer need not enter into a costly array of contractual
protections in order to keep others (especially the sellers) from using the
information and thereby saves on transaction costs.261 He also argues that patent
facilitates the creation of technical information and the use of that information in
team production. Patents enable the critical information to be used within the
team without fear that one of the team members will defect. The alternative
would again be costly contracts with all employees in the team.262 Without the
need to monitor these contracts, the firm can facilitate team production more
efficiently.263
The property-rights theory of the firm explicitly alludes to the importance
of intellectual property. In describing the theory, Oliver Hart uses forms of
intellectual property as examples of the “glue” that binds employees to the
firm.264 The protections for this type of property are designed to manage not only
the interactions between firms, but also between the firm and its employees. Dan
Burk and Brett McDonnell similarly highlight the way that intellectual property
rights balance property interests between firms as well as within firms. 265
Employees have an interest in exploiting information they have created on the
job, both within the firm and outside the firm when on the job market.266 Patent,
copyright, and trade secrets each balance the firm’s needs and the individual
employee’s needs in separating employee information “assets” from firm assets.
Burk and McDonnell point out that this division mirrors that of agency law and
the corporate opportunity doctrine, in that the critical factors are whether the
information/opportunity arose in the context of employment with the use of firm
resources. 267 Moreover, they point out that the weakest form of intellectual
property protection – trade secrets protection – applies to the type of information
most likely to overlap with an employee’s own information capital. 268 This
balancing of rights within firms and between firms leads to their “Goldilocks”
hypothesis: the level of legal protection of intellectual property rights that
minimizes transaction costs will be somewhere between a system that provides
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strong rights to firms and a system of weak rights for firms. 269 And this
calibration of legal rights is necessary to balance individual participation with
group production; the degree of control over the participants is largely irrelevant.
Finally, the participation theory of employment has explanatory power in areas of
labor and employment law. The ability of the firm’s supervisory authorities to
control the minute details of work, as opposed to the overall scope of a project,
does not explain why employees should be singled out for protection. An
employee can still be given largely free reign to create and produce within the
firm, and an independent contractor’s work can still be closely supervised and
monitored. However, the notion that employees are participating in a common
enterprise explains why that enterprise would have certain obligations to those
employees within that relationship.270 The firm is not only responsible for the
effects of the acts of its employees; it is also responsible to those employees as
well. Employment laws are designed to enforce upon employers certain types of
responsibility for their participants. Within the common boundaries of the firm,
employers have an obligation to pay for minimum wage and overtime; provide
family and medical leave; avoid discrimination; bargain with collective
representatives; adhere to certain requirements as to retirement and health care
benefits; and provide insurance in case of unemployment. Employers have the
responsibility to provide these things because employees are participants in the
employers’ common enterprise.271 Team production justifies obligations from the
team to the individual members.272
At the same time, participation theory might help us articulate why our
definition of “employee” seems too crabbed or limiting when it comes to certain
types of labor and employment protections. For example, employers at the fringes
of the labor market have used the structure of the firm to regulate their exposure
to wage and hour protections.273 Because the FLSA uses a definition of “employ”
that includes “to suffer or permit to work,”274 courts have expanded its definition
of “employee” to include workers with some degree of independence from a
traditional firm relationship. This exception to the general dominance of the
“control” test may signal that different definitions of employment are
269
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appropriate—or one could argue instead that certain wage and hour violations
should protect workers beyond the employment relationship. Other countries
have taken the approach of expanding such protections to include so-called
“dependent contractors,” who may have independence from the firm but not true
independence from the economic relationship. 275 Rather than lumping these
dependent contractors into the employment relationship, it may make more sense
to recognize that wage and hour protections should run to contractual as well as
firm relationships.276 Similarly, protections against discrimination are arguably
justifiable for employees as well as partners, although Title VII only applies to the
former. Labor and employment laws provide a diversity of regulatory schemes,
and there may be good reasons to extend some of those schemes beyond the
common definition of employment.277 However, it is important to first establish a
common notion of employment, in order to give meaning to the category beyond
a chameleon-esque placeholder. Participation theory provides the best common
definition for the category.
In addition, participation explains why employees themselves have a duty
to the firm. The fiduciary obligations of corporate directors are well-established:
directors owe duties of loyalty, care, and good faith in the exercise of their
responsibilities. Delaware recently extended these obligations to corporate
officers as well. 278 However, the common law has long maintained that even
lower-level employees owe fiduciary obligations to their employer. 279 These
obligations are explored in the Restatement Third of Employment Law, which
provides that “[e]mployees owe a duty of loyalty to their employer in matters
related to the employment relationship.”280 Employees breach the duty of loyalty
by disclosing or using the employer's confidential information, competing with
the employer, or appropriating the property of the employer or engaging in selfdealing.281 Under a control theory of employment, these obligations do not really
make any sense—why should those who are more controlled by the firm have an
obligation of loyalty to the firm? But the participation theory nicely explains why
275
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individual firm members would owe duties to the ongoing enterprise of which
they are a part.282
Admittedly, participation theory does not solve a number of extant issues
with the definitions of employee and employment. It does not explain why some
participants in a common enterprise—family members, for example, or
prisoners—are not considered to be employees despite their compensated labor.283
It also does not differentiate between employees who are simply employees and
those who are labeled as supervisors, managers, or officers and thus are excluded
from the definition of “employee” for certain purposes.284 “Control” is sometimes
used as a distinguishing factor in this context: those who are controlled by the
firm are employees, while those who control the firm (and/or their coworkers) are
not.285 But employees from the bottom to the top of the firm’s hierarchy are all
participants in the ongoing economic enterprise; those who have more power
within the firm may, in fact, be even more closely associated with it. The purpose
of the participation standard for employment is to distinguish between employees
and independent contractors—between those who are inside and outside of the
firm. It does not distinguish between employees as to their roles within the firm;
it does not say which employees can be considered the “employer” for purposes
of certain labor and employment law regimes. In those cases, control may be a
more appropriate guide.286 However, the fact that courts have used the control
test to distinguish both between employees and independent contractors, as well
as between employees and employers, provides some indication of the inherent
incoherence of the test as currently constituted.
Control is not necessary in finding a worker to be part of an organization.
Although commentators such as Guy Davidov have included the notion of being
controlled as critical to the concept of employment,287 such a requirement (in my
282
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view) is unnecessary and limiting. An employee remains an employee whether in
an extremely hierarchical workplace or in a more collaborative and democratic
environment.288 In fact, the notion that employees must be controlled—must be
deprived of power within the firm—has perhaps been a self-fulfilling prophecy.289
Viewing employees as participants rather than pawns will not only accord better
with the economic reality of the modern workplace,290 but will also send a signal
about the proper role of employees within the organization.

V. THE FUTURE OF EMPLOYMENT IN THE LAW
The preceding discussion assumes the continuing vitality of the concept of
employment within the law. However, both the employment relationship and the
firm itself—at least, in its most common legal persona of the corporation—have
questionable long-term prospects. The corporation is under siege by a plethora of
new organizational structures, most notably the limited liability company (LLC).
When the Treasury moved to “check-the-box” taxation for these new entities, they
became viable alternatives to the corporation in a variety of different fields.291
The flexibility of the LLC form is in contrast to many of the requirements, state
and federal, placed upon the corporation.292 It seems, perhaps, as if Jensen &
Meckling’s “nexus of contracts” model is coming to life in the LLC, and the
corporation’s failure to live up to their model is bringing it down.
The employment relation is moving from firm to market as well. In the
mid-twentieth century, labor economists identified internal labor markets as a
deviation from neoclassical labor market theory.293 These economists found that
employees largely stayed within one firm for their lifetime of employment, and
that firms generally used internal promotion to fill vacancies. These findings
established an empirical basis for Coase’s notion of the importance of the
employment relation to the firm. Moreover, internal labor markets are an
instantiation of the separateness of the firm from the market; they demonstrate
cannot be justified on the grounds of efficiency or expertise, he nevertheless believes that
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288
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that the firm is truly a different set of relationships. However, economists are
finding that the importance of internal labor markets has been dwindling.
Beginning in the 1970s, firms began to hire more temporary and contingent
workers. 294 This trend accelerated through the 1990s, and continues apace.
Recent reports indicate that the 2008 recession has turned many employees into
“permanent” temporary workers, with as much as 26 percent of the workforce
now having “nonstandard” jobs.295 And the effects go beyond low-skill and lowwage employment; executive officers, lawyers, and scientists are all among the
temporarily employed.296 Moreover, “outsourcing” – a word of relatively recent
vintage – continues to break down relationships that were traditionally within the
firm.297 What Alan Hyde said in 1998 continues to be true today: “Increasingly,
labor is hired through short-term, market-mediated arrangements that may not be
‘employment’ relations in any legal or technical sense of that word.”298
If the corporation is giving way to a more contractually-oriented form of
business enterprise, and the employment relationship is dissolving back into the
market, then perhaps corporations (or their successor organizational forms) will
exist only to structure financial relationships and confer limited liability. There is
reason to believe, however, that the firm and the corporation will remain relevant
to our economic system. From the organizational perspective, the role of the
“uncorporation” remains limited under current law. 299 It seems likely that not
only will the public corporation survive, but it will be made even less contractual
after the passage of finance reform legislation.300 And in the employment context,
the flight from employment seems driven by an effort to avoid employmentrelated regulations and restrictions, rather than the disappearance of the firm
itself. In fact, many employers are looking to tie their employees even more
closely to the firm and its image. The importance of “brand” for businesses
means that employees are critical to reifying and promoting the brand, especially
in service industries. Firms have used branding to draw out psychological
commitments from employees that are not reciprocal on the part of the
employer.301 Participation by enthusiastic employees is becoming more important
to the role of the firm, not less.
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In fact, it may be that the tide is turning back to a more employee-oriented
workplace. Popular management literature emphasizes the importance of the
employee. 302 Small startups, particularly in the tech industry, are once again
blurring the line between entrepreneur and employee.303 Academia is evolving, as
well. As discussed earlier, recent research into the theory of the firm has focused
on the importance of knowledge-based assets and the distribution of access top
those assets within the firm.304 As we learn more about the importance of trust,
norms, and procedural justice within the corporation, employees will grow even
more in importance.305
It is possible to envision a radically individualized future, in which each
worker is a “corporation” unto herself and firms are merely temporary
agglomerations within the global market. It is also possible to envision a future in
which employees participate at the highest levels of governance, and corporations
are tools of team production rather than investor enrichment. Perhaps both of
these futures are in store, to varying degrees within different industries. Further
exploration into the role of the firm will enable us to better understand these
changes and manage them efficiently through the legal system.

CONCLUSION
To better understand the meaning of employment, we need to look to the
organizational structures that create the employment relationship. We recognize a
category of “employees” because we recognize the employers that harness their
collective labor in pursuit of a common economic enterprise. By looking to the
literature on the theory of the firm, we can better understand the importance of
“employment” as an economic and legal concept, and we can better define that
role to meet the definitional needs of various doctrines. At this point in our
history, it makes sense to consider an employee to be one who participates in joint
production within the context of a firm, rather than one who is controlled by an
employer. Such a conception of employment as participation will enable us to
better understand the reasons why we have a common conception of employment
that ribbons throughout our law. Because employees participate within a firm,
they are responsible to the firm, and the firm is responsible both to and for them.
We currently are a nation largely of employees. But that could change. In
the end, it will be our approach to the concept of firms that will dictate whether
the employment relationship—as defined in law—is a historical anachronism or a
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basis for continued common production. By better understanding the nature of
employment, and better framing it as a legal concept, we can understand its
strengths and limitations as a legal tool, and employ that tool properly in the
future.
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